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MONEY IS FOR NOTHING: THE INHERENT WANT OF 
CONSIDERATION FOUND IN SUBSTANTIAL EXCLUSIVITY 
TERMS WITHIN TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS 
 
Paul C. Alexander II* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most enduring misunderstandings within the 
American public is that Indian gaming makes Native American 
tribes instantly wealthy. Although the unemployment rate within 
tribal communities is about 15%,1 this statistic is not wholly 
representative. Unemployment rates in some tribal communities 
exceed 80%.2 The myth of the wealthy Indian endures because 
wealthier gaming tribes represent the exception rather than the 
norm. Economically successful tribes, such as the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe, the Mohegan Tribe, the Pechanga Band of Luiseño 
Indians, and the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, are the 
faces of the myth and are unfortunately not the norm.3 The reality, 
                                                                                                             
*J.D. Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, Class of 2017; M.A. in 
History, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, May 2013; Member of the 
Ramapough Lenape Nation. The author would like to thank Dean Angelique 
EagleWoman for her lessons and guidance during her time at the University of 
Idaho College of Law and while this article was in its infancy. The author would 
also like to thank Professor Gray H. Whaley for his lessons, guidance, and 
patience, while the author finished his Masters study. The Author also would like 
to thank all those who either read earlier versions of this article and provided 
feedback or helped in other ways to make this article happen, including, but not 
limited to: Professor Peter C. Alexander (a.k.a. Uncle Peter), Professor Robert 
Williams, Jr., Travis Hartshorn, James Johnson, Annie Chaivre, and everyone else 
who contributed during this process in one way or another. Finally, the author 
would like to thank the AILJ editorial staff for their contributions and suggestions 
during the editing process. 
1 Dispelling the Myths About Indian Gaming, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND 
(Jan. 14, 2015), http://www. narf.org/indian-gaming/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
2 Vincent Schilling, Getting Jobbed: 15 Tribes With Unemployment Rates Over 
80 Percent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/29/danger-zone-15-tribes-
unemployment-rates-over-80-percent-151078 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
3 See NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, supra note 1. See also Mark Fogarty, 
California Indian Gaming Reaches $7 Billion Again, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
MEDIA NETWORK (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/10/31/california-indian-
gaming-reaches-7-billion-again-162240 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). The 
Mashantucket Pequot are located in Connecticut and own the Foxwoods Resort 
Casino. The Mohegan Tribe is also located in Connecticut and own the 
Mohegan Sun. The Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians are located in California 
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as of 2014, is that while the 459 Indian gaming facilities within the 
United States generated over $28 billion dollars in gross revenues, 
26 out of 566 federally recognized tribes produced 40.3% of the 
revenue.4 The remaining 540 tribes shared the remaining 59.7% of 
revenue. 
A second myth lies in the fundamental discrepancy of the 
economic realities for gaming tribes; all gaming tribes enjoy all the 
fruits of the gaming enterprises. This is false because of how the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) has been 
implemented in practice and construed by the United States 
Supreme Court.5 Under the IGRA, the state is able to receive a 
percentage of net gaming revenue because any tribe that seeks to 
pursue Las Vegas or Atlantic City style gaming must enter into a 
tribal-state compact with a state.6 This allows the state bordering the 
reservation to secure for itself a substantial portion of net gaming 
revenue before the tribe realizes its profit since the IGRA allows the 
compact to include anything “directly related” to gaming.7 Although 
the IGRA initially required the states to negotiate compacts with 
tribes in “good faith,”8 the United States Supreme Court has 
declared the means of enforcing the “good faith” requirement 
unconstitutional.9 Many states now use compacting to require that 
tribes provide the state with a percentage of tribal gaming revenue 
under the guise of revenue sharing agreements.  
In the typical revenue sharing agreement, the state will promise 
the tribe that it will not allow any form of gaming competition within 
a defined area. This is commonly known as a “substantial 
                                                                                                             
and own the Pechanga Resort and Casino. Finally, the Shakopee Mdewakanton 
Sioux Community are located in Minnesota and own the Mystic Lake Casino. 
4 Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016); 2014 Tribal 
Gaming Revenues by Gaming Operation Revenue Range, NATIONAL INDIAN 
GAMING COMMISSION (Jul. 8, 2015), www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/ 
reports/2014GGRbyGamingOperationRevenueRange.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 
2016). 
5 25 U.S.C. § 2701–2721 (2012). 
6 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012).  
7 Id. § 2710(d) (2012).  
8 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
9 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (overruling 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (providing a cause of action for Tribes in United States District 
Court should a state refuse to negotiate a compact in good faith). 
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exclusivity” agreement. The Department of the Interior consistently 
interprets substantial exclusivity as one of the quite few “meaningful 
concessions” a state can provide as consideration.10 In 2004, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, George Skibine, defined 
“substantial exclusivity” as something that provides a quantifiable 
economic benefit the state is not required to provide.11 Such benefits 
include, “exclusive rights to game on a geographical basis [or] to 
tribes against non-Indian gaming. It also [can allow] the tribe to 
game in a geographical area to the exclusion of other Indian 
tribes.”12 While substantial exclusivity is determined on a first-
come-first-serve basis, it tends to require a prohibition against non-
Indian competition or fee relinquishment if the state allows non-
Indian competition.13 Consideration, however, is absent from 
substantial exclusivity agreements in a tribal economic framework. 
The state does not make a meaningful concession that accords with 
kinship relations, good faith transactions, generosity, stewardship 
                                                                                                             
10 Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to Gary E. Johnson, 
Governor of New Mexico, (Aug. 23, 1997); See Letter from Kevin Washburn, 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, to Gary Besaw, Chairman, Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Mar. 12, 2015) (denying Tribal-State compact 
between Menominee and Wisconsin); Letter from Kevin Washburn, Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs, to Deval Patrick, Governor of Connecticut (Oct. 12, 
2012) (denying Tribal-State compact between the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 
and Connecticut); see also Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States As 
Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal Relationship: A Historical Critique of Tribal-
State Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 185, 211 (2010). On occasion, 
the Department of the Interior will consider a package deal including substantial 
exclusivity and other benefits to satisfy the meaningful concession requirement. 
Such circumstances typically depend on the percentage of net revenue the 
revenue sharing agreement calls for. See infra Part V.C. 
11 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 1529 Before the 
Comm. on Indian Affair, 108th Cong. 108-475, 33–36 (2004); see also Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39, 
75 n. 243 (2007) (providing older interpretations of the meaning of “substantial 
exclusivity”). 
12 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 1529 Before the 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 108-475, 33–36 (2004) (statement of 
George Skibine, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy and Economic 
Development, Dep’t of the Interior). 
13 Press Release, Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, Statement on the New 
Mexico Gaming Compacts (Aug. 23, 1997), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071031090013/http://www.doi.gov/news/archive
s/indnmcom.html. 
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and protection of resources, and interdependence with all living 
creatures.14 
At a basic level, the IGRA clashes with tribal economics because 
it stipulates how tribes can use gaming revenue. This denies inherent 
tribal sovereignty because a tribe cannot fully define how it can use 
gaming revenue for tribal betterment.15 An ostensible argument 
exists that Congress acted pursuant to its trust responsibility through 
this infringement on tribal sovereignty. However, that argument is 
weak. In reality, the tribal-state compact breaches trust because 
revenue sharing agreements allow the state to secure a percentage of 
net gaming revenue before the tribe can allocate revenue for tribal 
betterment or distribute per capita payments to tribal members.16 
Trust is further violated because tribes are unable to define surplus 
revenue and cannot provide for the tribal community before gifting 
revenue to the state. To put it bluntly, the IGRA’s mechanism that 
allows the state to take a cut of gaming revenue before the tribe 
actually realizes gaming revenue is a failure by the United States to 
ensure that tribal needs are met. 
Revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity agreements 
represents a failure by the United States because states are not 
negotiating in good faith. Compacts are typically devoid of the 
proper consideration necessary within a tribal economy. Want of 
consideration exists because the tribe must promise to provide the 
state a percentage of net revenue to begin compact negotiations. For 
tribal economics, the tribe loses the ability to define surplus revenue 
to contribute as a gift and forces the tribe to provide to the state 
before its own members. Tribal members are provided for last. 
                                                                                                             
14 See Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding 
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints – Recommendations for 
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 384–5 
(2008) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics]; see also Angelique 
EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics: The Historical and 
Contemporary Impacts of Intergenerational Material Poverty and Cultural 
Wealth Within the United States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 805, 836 (2010) 
[hereinafter EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics]. 
15 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012); see also EagleWoman, Tribal Nation 
Economics, supra note 14, at 408–9. Under the IGRA, tribes are limited to using 
net gaming revenue to fund tribal government or programs, the general welfare 
for the tribe, reinvestment for further economic development, donations, or to 
fund local government agencies. 
16 See, e.g., infra Part V.C. 
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To show that substantial exclusivity arrangements do not 
provide consideration in a tribal economy, this article will first 
discuss what tribes expected from the IGRA. This will explain tribal 
economics and survey the political battle antecedent to the IGRA 
passage in 1988 where states attempted to regulate and tax tribal 
economic enterprises. Also to be discussed is the IGRA statutory 
requirements and what the tribal expectations were from the IGRA. 
Second, this article discusses initial challenges by both states and 
tribes after the IGRA’s passage and the seminal case Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida where the Supreme Court declared the IGRA’s 
enforcement mechanism for good faith negotiations 
unconstitutional. Third, this article transitions to discuss the absence 
of tribal economics in revenue sharing agreements. This is done 
through explaining what the Secretary deems a meaningful 
concession, how the Seminole decision forces tribes to submit to 
state demands for revenue sharing to begin compact negotiations, 
and how courts refuse to amend bad faith compacts. Fourth, this 
article demonstrates how consideration is wanting in substantial 
exclusivity provisions because gaming provides inherent economic 
benefits. Consideration is also wanting because substantial 
exclusivity is illusory. To demonstrate that consideration is wanting 
in a tribal economic model, this article analyzes practices employed 
by New York, Oklahoma, California, and Idaho. Finally, this article 
proposes recommendations to provide adequate consideration for 
substantial exclusivity arrangements in a tribal economic model. 
Needless to say, all parties need to change their course of dealing 
with each other to achieve this goal. 
 
II. TRIBAL EXPECTATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY 
ACT 
 
A. Fleshing Out Tribal Economics 
 
Despite holding the power to deny compacts that violate the trust 
relationship, the Secretary approves revenue sharing for substantial 
exclusivity agreements that violate the trust relationship. Trust is 
violated because the compacting requirement forces the tribes and 
state to engage in a form of “cooperative federalism” that rejects 
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tribal economics.17 The IGRA is unique in that it attempts to pursue 
cooperative federalism through an attempt to balance tribal and state 
interests.18 Congress attempted to ensure this occurred through the 
requirement that states negotiate in good faith and the provision 
allowing a cause of action for tribes should a state fail to do so.19 In 
Seminole Tribe, however, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the enforcement mechanism to ensure good faith negotiations was 
unconstitutional.20 This has allowed states to reject traditional forms 
of tribal economics that focus on the whole community and maintain 
an individualistic mentality that attempts to undermine tribal 
sovereignty at the bargaining table. This strains self-determination 
because tribes are constricted to the state’s economic model for 
negotiations and are unable to engage in tribal economics at the 
bargaining table.21 Tribes are unable to maintain balance in their 
interactions and use of their resources as tribal economics demand 
because states often require tribes to agree to revenue sharing as a 
condition precedent to compacting.22 
A fundamental conflict exists between tribal economics and 
American capitalism. While profits and reinvestment drive 
capitalism, tribal economics depends on kinship relations, good faith 
dealings, and gift giving within the tribal community and 
neighboring communities.23 Unlike capitalism, tribal economics 
considers the community and not the individual as the economic 
unit. Individuals gain independence through the ability to provide 
                                                                                                             
17 Compare Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 
2002) aff’d sub nom Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 278 F. Supp. 
2d 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that the “IGRA is an example of ‘cooperative 
federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign interests of the 
federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role 
in the regulatory scheme.”); with Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and 
Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253 (2010) (discussing how 
cooperative federalism under the IGRA should be a cooperative tri-federalism –  
that includes the United States, state governments, and tribes each as sovereigns 
– that transitions from the trust relationship between the tribes and the United 
States). 
18 Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 
253 (2010). 
19 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A), (d)(7)(A) (2012). 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 Gover & Gede, supra note 10, at 214; see also sources cited infra note 88. 
22 EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics, supra note 14, at 836. 
23 Id. at 806–07.  
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not only for themselves, but also for the whole community.24 Status 
is then demonstrated by tribal members through gifts, feasts, and 
surplus trade within the tribe and the surrounding community.25 
Through this economic system, the tribe stewards all resources by 
first rationing out what is needed, and only then do surplus resources 
become commercial commodities for gifts or trade throughout the 
kinship network.26 This ensures that the tribe minimizes excess 
taking of all resources and ensures fair dealings throughout the 
kinship network.27 The tribe maintains a balance in commercial 
transactions by stewarding resources, providing for the community, 
and using the surplus to maintain kinship relations.28 The interaction 
between the tribes and the United States, based on this system of 
exchange, has been stated as the linking of arms between brothers.29 
 
B. The Political Battle Between Tribes and States Before the IGRA 
 
The IGRA was Congress’s answer to tension between Indian 
gaming and Public Law 280. In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 
280 to delegate criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes to 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.30 Public 
Law 280 also allowed all other states to voluntarily assume both 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes within their jurisdiction.31 
The grant of civil jurisdiction was only “over private civil litigation 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. at 807–08.  
25 Id. at 806–08. 
26 Id. at 806–08, 836-37. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 836. 
29 See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: 
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997) 
(discussing how during the 17th and 18th centuries western individuals had to 
cooperate with tribes as equals for survival and how constructions of laws and 
treaties during that time should reflect that). 
30 Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1953) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 & note 
(2006)). Upon receiving statehood, Alaska was added as the sixth mandatory 
Public Law 280 state. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2012). 
31 Public Law 280, ch. 505, at § 7, 590. 
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involving reservation Indians.”32 This does not include jurisdiction 
over “general civil regulatory powers, including taxation.”33 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, tribes began turning to bingo 
for economic development. Almost immediately, states sought to 
curtail tribal bingo and subject it to state regulation. The Fifth 
Circuit in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth first addressed 
whether a state that voluntarily assumed jurisdiction through Public 
Law 280 could regulate tribal bingo.34 There, Florida voluntarily 
assumed both civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes to the fullest 
extent of the law, and it regulated bingo by non-tribal 
organizations.35 However, the Seminole Tribe sought to engage in a 
profit-sharing agreement with a third party who would build and 
manage a bingo hall for the tribe.36 Broward County, Florida sought 
to prevent the profit sharing agreement through Florida’s statutory 
regulations.37 The court determined that Broward County exceeded 
Public Law 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction because Florida allowed 
bingo.38 
The second major case regarding tribal gaming before the IGRA 
was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.39 In Cabazon, 
California, a mandatory Public Law 280 state, sought to impose state 
law to the Cabazon Band’s gaming operation. The State also tried to 
force the Tribe to keep profits in “special accounts” and use profits 
only for charitable purposes.40 Riverside County, California also 
sought to subject the Tribe to ordinances prohibiting poker and other 
card games.41 To put it differently, California sought to stymie the 
Cabazon Band’s economic development by limiting the Tribe’s use 
of gaming profits and preventing tribal members from benefiting. 
California argued that although it allowed bingo and other forms of 
gambling, there was a public need to regulate high-stakes bingo to 
                                                                                                             
32 Bryan v. Itasca Cty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976). 
33Id. at 390. This determination as to the bounds of Public Law 280’s grant of 
civil jurisdiction has been defined as the “civil-regulatory” test. 
34 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312–315 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). 
35 Id. at 311, 313. 
36 Id. at 311. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 314–15. 
39 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
40 Id. at 205. 
41 Id. at 206. 
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prevent organized crime.42 The United States Supreme Court 
rejected California’s argument because California allowed gaming 
within its borders and its attempt to police the Cabazon Band’s 
gaming was regulatory under Public Law 280.43  
The Cabazon Court also answered whether a state could prevent 
tribes from making high-stakes bingo available to non-Indians who 
live off the reservation.44 The Court balanced the federal interest of 
allowing tribes to pursue “tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development” with the state interest in establishing law and 
regulations for its residents.45 The Court understood the significance 
of gaming to the Cabazon Band’s economy because the Tribe lacked 
natural resources.46 Through the balancing test, the Court 
determined that while California may have had “a legitimate 
concern” about organized crime, federal policy trumped the State’s 
interest because the gaming enterprise was critical for the Tribe to 
realize economic self-determination.47 
While the battles over regulating tribal gaming occurred, states 
and tribes also battled over whether a state can tax tribal enterprises 
on trust land to gain a cut of tribal revenue. Shortly after Cabazon, 
the Supreme Court in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana affirmed 
the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of a state tax on tribal coal mining on 
both reservation and “ceded land” because Montana did not have a 
legitimate interest.48 There, Montana sought to tax coal extracted 
from a “ceded area” of land that Congress required the Crow to 
handover to the United States in 1904.49 Although non-Indians 
gained ninety eight percent of the area, the Tribe started a coal 
mining enterprise after regaining ownership of the remaining two 
percent through the Indian Restoration Act of 1958.50 Montana then 
imposed a severance tax that varied from three to thirty percent and 
                                                                                                             
42 Id. at 211. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 216. 
45 Id. The State’s position was based on its ability to receive taxes from tribes 
stemming from transactions made by non-members on reservation lands. 
46 Id. at 218–221. 
47 Id. 
48 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d 
484 U.S. 997 (1988). 
49 Id. at 896. 
50 Id. at 896–97. 
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a gross proceeds tax on each person who mined coal.51 Through the 
Cabazon balancing test, the Court found that coal production was 
vital to the Crow’s economic development because coal leases 
“generate funds for essential Tribal service and provide employment 
for Tribal members.”52 The Court held that Montana’s taxation 
attempt to receive a portion of Crow’s revenue was not narrowly 
tailored enough to override the federal policy of tribal self-
determination.53 
Butterworth, Cabazon, and Crow Tribe set the stage for the 
IGRA. States had made it clear that they wanted to regulate tribal 
gaming, define what a tribe can do with gaming revenue, and take a 
share of tribal gaming revenue. Yet the courts acted as the tribes’ 
brother and prevented states from acting in bad faith to pirate from 
and control tribal economies. In 1988, Congress addressed the 
conflict between the states’ desire to regulate tribal gaming and the 
federal policy of tribal self-determination through the IGRA.54 
Unfortunately for tribes, the IGRA provided the states the 
mechanism necessary to regulate economic development and gain a 
share of tribal revenue. Congress did not provide a method for the 
tribes to assist states through surplus capital; it appeased its 
demanding children at the expense of its tribal brethren. 
 
C. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
 
Congress made it obvious that the IGRA was a response to 
Cabazon. At first glance, the IGRA seeks to provide statutory 
guidance for gaming to promote “tribal economic development, 
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments” through gaming.55 
However, the direct response to Cabazon is that the IGRA seeks:  
 
to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of 
gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from 
organized crime and other corrupting influences, to 
ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 901 (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 
202, 220 (1987)). 
53 Id. at 902. 
54 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3)-(4) (2012). 
55 Id. § 2702(1). 
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of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is 
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator 
and players.56 
 
The IGRA’s compact requirement extended Public Law 280’s 
reach into Class II and Class III gaming for non-Public Law 280 
States since all states must either allow tribes to conduct gaming 
within its borders or completely prohibit its citizens from gaming.57 
Congress created the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) 
to regulate Indian gaming, ensure congressional policy is met, and 
“to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.”58 
The Chairman of the NIGC is tasked with approving relevant tribal 
ordinances or resolutions for Class II or Class III gaming.59  
The IGRA charges the Secretary of Interior with approving 
tribal-state compacts required for Class III gaming.60 Although the 
“good faith” negotiation requirement’s enforcement process has 
been abrogated by the Supreme Court,61 the Secretary fulfills his 
duties through the review of compacts to ensure that the State does 
not impose “any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment” onto the 
tribe.62 Only if a compact violates the IGRA, federal law, or “the 
trust obligations of the United States to Indians” can the Secretary 
disapprove a compact.63 
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three separate classes 
with statutorily defined characteristics, restrictions, and 
requirements. First, Class I gaming consists of “social games solely 
for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming . . 
. as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. § 2702(2).  
57 See generally Jacob Berman, Such Gaming Causes Trouble: Constitutional 
and Statutory Confusion with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 23 SETON 
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 281, 283 (2013); Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the 
Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal 
Influence over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 976–77 (2007). 
58 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2704. 
59 Id. § 2705(3)–(4). 
60 Id. § 2710(d)(8)(i)–(iii). 
61 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012); with infra Part III (discussing 
how the United States Supreme Court determined § 2710(d)(3)(A) 
unconstitutional and the ramifications of that holding). 
62 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)–(4) (2012). 
63 Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B). 
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celebrations.”64 Congress expressly excluded Class I gaming from 
the IGRA’s statutory reach and placed it “within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Indian tribes.”65 
Second, games classified as Class II include “game[s] of 
chance” like bingo for monetary or other prizes “in which the game 
is won by the first person covering a previously designated 
arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards.”66 If a State 
allows or does not expressly prohibit card games, those games are 
also considered Class II games.67 To conduct Class II gaming for 
economic development, the tribe must be located in a state “that 
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or 
entity.”68 The NIGC Chairman must also approve a tribal 
“ordinance or resolution” that allows the gaming on Indian lands.69 
Finally, the IGRA defines Class III gaming as “all forms of 
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.”70 The most 
common forms of Class III games are those typically seen in Las 
Vegas or Atlantic City such as slots, poker, craps, blackjack, and 
roulette. To conduct Class III gaming for economic development, 
the tribe must meet the requirements to pursue Class II gaming.71 
The tribe must also request the bordering state to enter into tribal-
state compact negotiations.72 If that state allows the tribe to pursue 
Class III gaming by agreeing on a compact, the tribe must conduct 
the gaming enterprise “in conformance with [the] tribal-state 
compact.”73  
                                                                                                             
64 Id. § 2703(6) (2012). Examples of Class I games include archery, dice and 
shell games, and races. STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN 
GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 39 (2005). 
65 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012). 
66 Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I)–(III). 
67 Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).  
68 Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A). 
69 Id. § 2710(b)(1)(B). 
70 Id. § 2703(8). Colloquially, Class III gaming is known as Las Vegas or 
Atlantic City style gaming and includes slot machines and banking card games 
typically seen in modern casinos. See id. § 2703(7)(ii)(B). 
71 Id. § 2710 (d)(1)(A)–(C). 
72 Id. § 2710 (d)(3)(A). 
73 Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B)–(C). 
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The IGRA originally required the state to “negotiate with the 
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.”74 Compacts 
can contain agreements for: 1) civil and criminal jurisdiction for 
licensing and regulation; 2) criminal and civil jurisdiction for 
enforcement of laws and regulations; 3) costs to the state for 
regulation; 4) taxation of the tribe; 5) remedies for breach of 
contract; 6) standards operation and maintenance; and, 7) anything 
else directly related to gaming operations.75 Despite the vast scope 
of what a compact can entail, any assessment cannot “tax, fee, [or] 
charge” the tribe.76 After compact negotiations finish, the Secretary 
can deny compacts if he determines the compact violates the IGRA, 
Federal law not related to Indian gaming jurisdiction, or the trust 
relationship between the Tribe and the United States.77  
The IGRA provided tribes a cause of action in any United States 
district court for a state’s failure to enter into compact negotiations 
or refusal to negotiate in good faith.78 Before filing an action to 
compel negotiations, the tribe was required to provide the state with 
180 days to enter negotiations.79 After this period expired, the tribe 
then had to show the court that a compact had not been agreed upon 
and that the state did not respond to the request to negotiate or did 
not respond to the request in good faith.80 The state bore the burden 
to prove good faith negotiations and if the court found the state 
failed to negotiate in good faith, the court then ordered that a 
compact be agreed upon within 60 days.81 Should the tribe and state 
fail to fulfill the court order, each party then  provided a court-
appointed mediator a proposed compact.82 The mediator chose the 
best compact and submitted it to the tribe and the state.83 Upon 
receipt of the mediator’s decision, the state had 60 days to accept or 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). The enforcement process, through federal courts, of the 
requirement that the State negotiate in good faith has been deemed 
unconstitutional. See infra Part III. 
75 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii) (2012). 
76 Id. § 2710(d)(4). 
77 Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(i)–(iii). 
78 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012). 
79 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i). 
80 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(I)–(II). 
81 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii). 
82 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
83 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)–(v). 
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deny the decision.84 If the state agreed, then the compact would be 
submitted to the Secretary for further review.85 If not, then the 
Secretary promulgated procedures, with the Tribe’s assistance, that 
defined the Tribe’s Class III gaming opportunities consistent with 
the mediator’s chosen compact and the state’s law.86 
 
D. What Indian Gaming Intended to Provide Tribes 
 
Congress passed the IGRA in 1988 to “promote tribal economic 
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
government.”87 Congress recognized the persistent economic 
depression that plagues many reservations and intended for the 
IGRA to be a remedy. To put it differently, the IGRA is 
representative of the trust relationship between tribal nations and the 
United States based on historical kinship ties.88 The IGRA was an 
opportunity for tribes to achieve tribal self-sufficiency and to return 
to a state of prosperity enjoyed before European contact.89   
Although clearly an attempt to promote tribal self-
determination, Congress limited tribal inherent sovereignty. Under 
the IGRA, tribes are only granted the “exclusive right to regulate 
gaming activity on Indian lands” if that land is in a state that “does 
not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such 
gaming activity.”90 It is arguable that the IGRA intended to elevate 
tribal sovereignty to that of the bordering state and thus acted in 
good faith. The further erosion of tribal inherent sovereignty shows 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi)–(vii). 
85 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi). 
86 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 
87 Id. § 2701(4) (2012). 
88 The Supreme Court considers the trust relationship as one of a guardian-ward 
relationship. The tribes are considered wards of the United States and the United 
States acts as the tribes’ guardian, burdened with the “responsibility to protect or 
enhance tribal assets.” DAVID WILKINS AND TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN 
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 65 (2001); see 
also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[3][a] (2012) (discussing the historical development 
of the trust doctrine). 
89 See EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics, supra note 14, at 
838. 
90 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012). 
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the falsity of that argument because tribes are extraconstitutional 
and are not bound by federal law.91  
Tribes are extraconstitutional because they did not participate in 
the Constitutional Conventions and retain all sovereign rights not 
surrendered to the United States.92 Constitutional constraints do not 
apply to tribes, and their sovereignty is guaranteed by treaties that 
oblige the United States to protect Indian land from confiscation, 
“preserve tribal hunting, fishing, and usufructuary rights,” maintain 
tribal trust property, and provide specialized government services to 
tribes.93 Although tribes are extraconstitutional, the forced 
bargaining partner, the states, are bound by the Constitution and can 
have their rights enforced in United States District Court. Tribes do 
not have this liberty and have no recourse in Court absent 
congressional action.94 The IGRA did provide tribes a cause of 
action in the event states refused to negotiate in good faith. 
However, judicial action soon caused this enforcement mechanism 
to be deemed unconstitutional because it violated state 
sovereignty.95 States have seized on this declaration to refuse to 
negotiate in good faith and force tribes to submit to revenue sharing 
agreements. 
 
III. EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE IGRA AND THE END OF GOOD 
FAITH 
 
Both tribes and states responded to the IGRA’s compact 
requirement with discord. Tribes found the compacting requirement 
an infringement on their sovereignty. States still wanted the ability 
to regulate and control tribal gaming and not be forced to negotiate 
in good faith. As demonstrated below, however, the Court in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida declared the IGRA’s 
                                                                                                             
91 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896) (holding aspects of 
inherent tribal sovereignty not abrogated by Congress’s plenary authority over 
tribes are not subject to the United States Constitution).  
92 Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional 
Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 324 (2003). 
93 Hope Babcock, A Possible Solution to the Problem of Diminishing Tribal 
Sovereignty, 90 N.D. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (2014); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring 
the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 
76 (2007). 
94 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831). 
95 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). 
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enforcement process to ensure good faith negotiations 
unconstitutional.96 The Secretary and some courts have tried to 
provide tribes remedies if a state refuses to negotiate in good faith.97 
Yet, the reactionary measures taken have not gone far enough as 
they allow states to take a substantial amount of gaming net revenues 
through revenue sharing agreements. 
The Red Lake Band of Chippewa asserted to the court that the 
IGRA’s compact requirement exceeded Congress’s plenary power 
over tribes. To do so, the tribe argued that the IGRA violated: (1) 
their right to self-determination preserved in treaty rights, federal 
law, and inherent sovereignty; (2) the trust relationship; and, (3) 
their right to self-government in violation of the Fifth Amendment.98 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
determined that the tribe suffered no injury because Congress has 
“virtually unlimited power over the Indian tribes” and “tribal 
sovereignty is but a stick in front of a tank.”99 The court also 
determined that Congress acted pursuant to the trust relationship and 
ruled against the Tribe’s Fifth Amendment due process claim 
because Congress “could reasonably address the concern of 
infiltration of organized crime into Indian gaming.”100 The court 
upheld the compact requirement and appeased the states at the 
Tribe’s expense. This further eroded the relationship between tribes 
and the states who are seen as the United States’ children by tribes. 
Many states also did not see the need to negotiate in good faith 
with tribes. In early challenges, courts did require states to negotiate 
in good faith as demanded by the IGRA. For example, Connecticut 
refused to enter compact negotiations with the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe despite the State allowing “Las Vegas nights” with games of 
chance.101 The Second Circuit found that the Tribe requested the 
                                                                                                             
96 Id. at 57. 
97 See 25 C.F.R. § 291 (1999). 
98 Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 
1990). The Tribe also argued that the IGRA unconstitutionally restricted the 
powers of federal courts. Id. 
99 Id. at 11 (quoting Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. 
Supp. 1380, 1392 (D. Alaska 1988)). 
100 Id. at 16. 
101 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d. Cir. 
1990). 
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State to enter compact negotiations.102 This required Connecticut to 
negotiate with the Tribe for the same games allowed at “Las Vegas 
nights” because the State did not completely prohibit those 
games.103 Negotiations did “not necessarily [subject the Tribe] to 
the entire State law on gaming.”104 
Despite being forced to abandon traditional kinship trade with 
the United States, tribes maintained faith that the courts would 
continue to force the states to negotiate in good faith. This did not 
happen and the predetermined trade partner, the states, continued to 
reject good faith negotiations. Despite the United States’ 
responsibility to preserve tribal economics as part of its trust 
responsibility, many courts determined that the IGRA’s good faith 
requirement violated state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.105 These courts 
viewed the compacting requirement not as a demand but as a 
“discretionary act.”106 A circuit split arose that forced the United 
States Supreme Court to answer the question once and for all.107 
Unfortunately for tribes, the Court determined that although the 
IGRA required a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming, the state 
could not be forced to negotiate and eliminated the IGRA’s 
enforcement mechanism for good faith negotiations.108  
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court determined 
that the Seminole Tribe could not compel specific performance due 
to Florida’s refusal to enter good faith negotiations with the Tribe.109 
The Court acknowledged that “Congress clearly intended to 
                                                                                                             
102 Id. at 1028–29. 
103 Id. at 1029. 
104 United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 366 n. 10 
(8th Cir. 1990). 
105 See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1436–37 (10th Cir. 
1994) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom, Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of 
Okla., 517 U.S. 1129 (1996); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 11 F.3d 1016, 
1028 (11th Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996) (both courts determined that the Ex parte Young doctrine is not 
applicable to the “good faith” requirement because the state was the interested 
party, not an arm of the state). 
106 Ponca Tribe of Okla., 37 F.3d at 1437. 
107 See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that Connecticut had to enter compact negotiations after the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe requested that negotiations occur). 
108 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). 
109 Id. at 76. 
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abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity through [the good faith 
requirement in] § 2710(d)(7).”110 The Court also reaffirmed that the 
Indian Commerce Clause constituted of a “greater transfer of 
power” from the states to the United States than the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.111 Despite these findings, the Court determined 
that the IGRA’s requirement that states are subject to suit for failure 
to negotiate in good faith unconstitutional because it violated state 
sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.112 
The Court also rejected the Ex Parte Young exception for 
prospective injunctive relief against state officials to “end a 
continuing violation of federal law.”113 The Court believed that 
because Congress, in § 2710(d)(7), provided tribes the remedy of a 
declaratory judgment that demands compact negotiations under § 
2710(d)(3) to conclude within sixty days, the Seminole Tribe could 
not seek injunctive relief to compel negotiations.114 The Court 
determined that alternative remedies were not needed under § 
2710(d)(7), because should the state fail to comply with the 
declaratory judgment, both the tribe and state would then submit 
proposed compacts to a mediator as the IGRA required.115  
Although Congress attempted to fulfill its trust responsibility to 
protect and enhance tribal economics by providing tribes automatic 
relief should a State fail to negotiate, the Supreme Court rejected 
Congress’s responsible appropriation of a duty on a state to 
negotiate in good faith. Yet, Seminole’s holding left tribes in a 
precarious position because they could no longer challenge states 
that demanded a share of gaming revenue during compacting. Tribes 
are now dependent on the Secretary to issue regulations should the 
state refuse to negotiate. This new dependency exists since the 
                                                                                                             
110 Id. at 57.  
111 Id. at 62. The Court made this distinction since States do enjoy authority over 
interstate commerce through the dormant Commerce Clause but can only 
exercise authority over Indian Commerce through express delegations by 
Congress. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989) (distinguishing between the Indian Commerce Clause and Interstate 
Commerce Clause); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New 
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 845–46 (1982) (rejecting existence of dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause). 
112 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 76. 
113 Id. at 73–74 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
114 Id. at 74–76. 
115 Id. 
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IGRA provides tribes no other remedy when a state refuses to 
negotiate in good faith and agency action has proven inadequate.116 
 
IV. THE ABSENCE OF TRIBAL ECONOMICS IN REVENUE SHARING 
AGREEMENTS 
 
Class III gaming is an offshoot of the United States policy of 
self-determination that aims to provide tribes the means to “direct[] 
their own development.”117 Tribes remain subjected to Congress’s 
power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.”118 There 
is no question the IGRA limits tribes’ ability to achieve self-
determination because many states use the compact requirement to 
“extort Indian tribes” for gaming net revenue.119 This hurdle rejects 
the foundation of the kinship relationship between states and tribes 
as permanent neighbors since it disincentivizes tribes to act with 
generosity by assisting the states with gaming revenue. Congress has 
essentially forced tribes to become subservient and dependent on the 
state for the ability to operate Class III gaming for economic 
development because of the compacting requirement.120 This causes 
tension between the tribes and states because neither is looking out 
for the other’s best interest; rather, they seek only to profit of one 
another. 
The Seminole decision effectively ended the IGRA’s 
enforcement of good faith negotiations to ensure tribes received 
adequate consideration in compacts.121 States are no longer required 
to enter into compact negotiations and many demand that tribes 
agree to revenue sharing as a prerequisite for negotiations. This 
practice does not provide tribes adequate consideration within a 
tribal economy because good faith is absent, it avoids generosity in 
favor of greed, infringes on the tribes’ sovereign right to determine 
                                                                                                             
116 See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
117 COHEN, supra note 88, at § 21.01; see also Letter from President Richard M. 
Nixon to the United States Congress (July 8, 1970), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED 
STATES INDIAN POLICY, 256–58 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). 
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
119 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 58. 
120 Eric Lent, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State 
Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451, 
469–470 (2003). 
121 See supra Part III. 
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surplus revenue, and violates the foundations of the kinship 
relationship between tribes and the United States as brothers. 
Due to the United States’ failure to require states to act in good 
faith, tribes are unable to steward and protect the monetary resources 
Class III gaming provides. Revenue sharing spurns tribal 
sovereignty because tribes bargain with states as unequal 
sovereigns, though both enjoy concurrent regulatory jurisdiction. 
The tribes’ bargaining power is limited to its projected economic 
contributions that states crave, which makes tribes slightly more 
powerful than a mere beggar at negotiations. 
The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States illustrated that tribes 
lack bargaining power.122 This came from a rejection of the 
Secretary’s promulgation of 25 C.F.R. Part 291 in response to 
Seminole.123 The rules contain provisions that apply when the state 
and tribe cannot agree on a compact, and the state asserts state 
sovereign immunity in actions brought under § 2710(d)(7)(B).124 
The Fifth Circuit determined that the rules were “not a reasonable 
interpretation of [the] IGRA” because they violated the Johnson Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1166, and “may authorize Class III gaming without a 
compact.”125 Tribes have no recourse but to accept substantial 
exclusivity if a state demands revenue sharing especially when a 
state considers it a gift rather than a detriment.126  
This article will now discuss the evolution of revenue sharing 
agreements and substantial exclusivity by categorically expanding 
                                                                                                             
122 See text accompanying infra note 125. 
123 25 C.F.R. § 291.1 (1999) (stating that regulations under this part are invoked 
when a state and tribe cannot agree to a compact or if a state invokes sovereign 
immunity in suit brought under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)). 
124 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.1, 291.8 (1999). 
125 Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 509 (5th Cir. 2007). The Johnson Act 
makes it illegal to use or possess any gaming device within Indian Country. In 
addition, the Texas Court inferred that because the Department of Interior can 
allow a tribe to pursue Class III gaming without a compact, it is a de facto 
breach of deferred congressional power to allow a tribe to pursue gaming 
without the state’s consent. See 24 U.S.C. § 1175(a) (2012). Similarly, 18 
U.S.C. § 1166 (2012) delegates to the states both regulatory and criminal 
authority over gambling in “Indian Country” except for gaming permitted under 
the IGRA. “Indian Country” is defined as tribal reservation land under the 
jurisdiction of the United States, any “dependent Indian community” within the 
United States, and Indian allotments and titles that have not been extinguished 
by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
126 Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc. v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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on how the agreements violate tribal economics. This will show how 
accepted practices underlying revenue sharing for substantial 
exclusivity agreements do not provide tribes adequate consideration. 
The United States District Court of Alaska’s metaphor that “tribal 
sovereignty is but a stick in front of a tank” continues to apply.127 
The difference here is that the definition of “Indian Country” is not 
the stick, as thought of by the United States District Court of 
Alaska.128 Rather, the tribe’s ability to properly negotiate with states 
is the stick because the United States, as the tank, does not require 
states to negotiate in good faith. The lack of good faith exists 
because substantial exclusivity is not adequate consideration within 
a tribal economy. Because of this, the United States continues to fail 
to act as a proper brother to the tribes by controlling its children, the 
states. 
 
A. Meaningful Concessions 
 
The “IGRA [attempts to be] an example of ‘cooperative 
federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign 
interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian 
tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme.”129 Tribal 
economics is rejected though because compacts deny tribes the 
ability to incorporate kinship relations into dealings and forces them 
to submit to American capitalism.130 Each compact represents a 
breach of trust as each secretarial approval is an implicit application 
of an assimilation policy that rejects good faith and generous 
exchanges for the betterment of all persons. A meaningful 
concession in tribal economics is a detriment that is made for the 
betterment of everyone. Substantial exclusivity is devoid of that 
feature. 
                                                                                                             
127 Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380, 
1392 (D. Alaska 1988) rev’d, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1990) opinion withdrawn 
and superseded on denial of reh’g, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991). 
128 Id. 
129 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. 
California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2015). 
130 See FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE 
THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 13–15 (Bison Books ed. 2001). 
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The state’s refusal to consider everyone possibly affected by a 
compact is demonstrated in the aftermath of the Mashantucket 
Pequot’s 1990 successful challenge to Connecticut’s refusal to 
negotiate.131 The compact the two parties agreed to contains the first 
revenue sharing provision. The Tribe provided the State with 
specified percentages of net revenue from particular pari-mutuel 
games.132 The parties later expanded the revenue sharing agreement 
to provide that the Tribe would provide the larger of “$100 million 
or twenty-five percent” of net revenue derived from slot 
machines.133 In return, the State provided the Tribe with the 
exclusive right to install and operate slot machines.134 In 1994, 
exclusivity ended when the State compacted with the Mohegan 
Tribe, also in Connecticut, for the use of slot machines.135  
Through the original substantial exclusivity term’s breach, it is 
evident that adequate consideration cannot be found in any such 
agreement. As other tribes pursue gaming for economic 
development, good faith is unascertainable because subsequent 
compacts can inherently breach substantial exclusivity agreements. 
This puts all kinship relations between a state and relevant tribes at 
risk as they are not considered at the time of compacting.136 
Despite the inherent conflict with tribal economics, the 
Secretary has taken the position that substantial exclusivity 
agreements are compatible with the jurisprudential standard of good 
faith.137 After Seminole, the Secretary defined the standard for good 
                                                                                                             
131 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
132 Tribal-State Compact, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe-Conn., § 8(b) (1991). 
(Compact published for notice and comment Apr. 17, 1991; compact approved 
and published May 31, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 24996). Although the Compact 
contained a provision that stated that nothing in the compact would be construed 
to be an extension of Connecticut taxes, the compact required the Mashantucket 
Pequot to “takeout” a percentage of winning pari-mutual tickets as influenced by 
Connecticut law. Id. §§ 17(f), 8(b). (The Secretary responded to this expansion, 
and others, of Connecticut tax law by not modifying such provisions as they 
were a result of the compact bargain). 
133 Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 511 (1995). 
134 Id. 
135 Tribal-State Compact, Mohegan Tribe-Conn., § 3(a)(i), (1994), (compact 
approved and published 59 Fed. Reg. 65130).  
136 See infra Part V.C.3. California has begun compacting with area tribes to not 
pursue Class III gaming for economic development while requiring nearby Class 
III tribes to agree in their compacts that they will provide the nongaming tribe 
with a percentage of revenue. 
137 See supra note 10. 
 
 
 
190 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:1 
 
 
faith as whether the state “offered meaningful concessions in return 
for its demands.”138 The Secretary maintains that substantial 
exclusivity is one of few meaningful concessions a state can provide 
a tribe in return for revenue sharing.139 The Secretary defines 
substantial exclusivity as “prohibiting non-Indian gaming from 
competing with Indian gaming or by agreeing to relinquish 
payments if non-Indian gaming is permitted by the state in the 
future.”140 The Secretary maintains that a meaningful concession 
abides by the statutory demand that the State cannot compact to 
“impose any tax, fee, charge or other assessment on an Indian 
tribe.”141  
Courts reviewing whether the Secretary appropriately found that 
the state provided a meaningful concession look to the totality of the 
circumstances as to whether the state’s concessions counterbalance 
the revenue sharing fee.142 Analysis is through “[g]eneral principles 
of federal contract law” rather than the lens of the trust 
                                                                                                             
138 Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. California, 331 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2003) [hereinafter In re Indian Gaming Cases]. This definition of good faith 
enables the court to retain pre-Seminole constructions of 25 U.S.C. § 
2710(d)(1)(B). For example, the In re Indian Gaming Cases Court construed the 
statute to mean that “a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that 
others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.” Id. at 1099 
(quoting Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 
1258 (9th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit appears to be the only 
circuit to earnestly distinguish meaningful concessions from taxes. See 
Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 784 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 2015) cert. 
denied, 136 S.Ct. 231 (2015); Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, 155 F. 
Supp 3d 972, 992 (D.S.D. 2015); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 
932 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Ninth Circuit is the only to address the 
validity of the agreements). Although not in line with revenue sharing, the 
Eighth Circuit recently indicated that challenges to the validity of revenue 
sharing agreements would depend on whether the tribe is the “primary 
beneficiary” of the compact. City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa, 785 F.3d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 2015). Such speculation is 
warranted because the Court quoted both statutory language and legislative 
history stating that Congress’s goal is to promote tribal economic development 
and prevent tribes from being wholly dependent on the federal government for 
funding. 
139 Babbitt, supra note 13. 
140 Id.  
141 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4); see also In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 
1112. 
142 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1112. 
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relationship.143 Because § 2710(d)(4) does not categorically prohibit 
fee demands, if the court determines that the parties agreed to the 
fee in good faith, the court interprets the fee as not a tax.”144 Courts 
that analyze whether a revenue sharing provision is a fee or a tax: 
 
(I) may take into account the public interest, public 
safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse 
economic impacts on existing gaming activities, and 
 
(II) shall consider any demand by the State for direct 
taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as 
evidence that the State has not negotiated in good 
faith.145 
 
Through this analysis, the court and the Secretary often determine 
that revenue sharing is not a tax because tribes make the sovereign 
business decision to enter into the compact.146 This forces tribes to 
reject generosity because rather than assist the state after providing 
for the tribe, they are forced to provide for the state before tribal 
members. Tribes have no incentive to further assist the state.147 
Courts refuse to integrate tribal economics into the analysis because 
cooperative federalism seeks to “incorporat[e] or integrat[e] Indian 
tribes as sovereign political entities within ‘Our Federalism.’”148 
Because tribal economics contrasts sharply with American 
capitalism,149 substantial exclusivity does not promote the building 
                                                                                                             
143 Cachil Dehe Band of Wintum Indians v. California, 618 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th 
Cir. 2010); see Gover & Gede, supra note 10, at 214 (stating that the IGRA has 
forced tribes to become players in state law and policy). 
144 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1112. 
145 Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v. 
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)). 
146 Lent, supra note 120, at 469–470 (2003). 
147 But see id. at 470 (stating that tribes use substantial exclusivity not to achieve 
an asset but to pay for the right to pursue gaming). 
148 Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 18, at 287. 
149 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE PRESENT 34 (first paperback ed. 1988); Manley 
A. Begay, Jr. et al., Development, Governance, Culture: What are They and 
What Do They Have to Do with Rebuilding Native Nations?, in REBUILDING 
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 34, 34–41 
(Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007) (discussing the conditions tribes face when 
pursuing economic development); EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics, 
supra note 14, at 396–98 (discussing United States trade restraints on tribes and 
tribal responses). 
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and maintenance of the kinship relationship between tribes and 
states. The relationships are rejected because the state determines 
the percentage of net revenue it receives and defines the exclusivity 
territory which often is not economically advantageous for the 
tribe.150 This demonstrates the lack of good faith, generosity, and 
fundamental differences between capitalism and tribal economics 
and why a traditional contract law analysis is insufficient. There 
simply is no consideration provided by the state to accord with tribal 
economics. 
 
B. Creating Dependence on a State is Not a Meaningful 
Concession 
 
Although Congress has not demonstrated a clear intent to 
abrogate tribal inherent sovereignty,151 substantial exclusivity 
provisions have changed the sovereignty hierarchy. Every approved 
compact further erodes tribal sovereignty because states impose 
requirements in addition to revenue sharing. States can require 
regulatory authority over the gaming enterprise and reimbursement 
for costs the state incurs in regulation or enforcement.152 States have 
also required tribes to provide “payments in lieu of taxes” to account 
in advance for localized services including emergency services and 
policing.153 This forces tribes to make the decision of whether the 
potential economic benefits of Class III gaming are for the best 
                                                                                                             
150 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 66–68 (discussing the rise of off-reservation 
gaming). 
151 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039 (2014). 
152 See generally Tribal-State Compact, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe-Mass., 
(2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg. 6213); Tribal-State 
Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y. (2002) (compact approved and 
published 67 Fed. Reg. 72968); Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene Tribe-
Idaho (1992) (compact approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 8478); Tribal-State 
Compact, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe-Conn. (1991) (compact published for 
notice and comment Apr. 17, 1991; compact approved and published 56 Fed. 
Reg. 24996); Tribal-State Compact, Omaha Tribe of Neb.-Neb. (1990) (compact 
approved and published 57 Fed. Reg. 7290). 
153 See Kevin K. Washburn, Indian Gaming: A Primer on the Development of 
Indian Gaming, The NIGC and Several Important Unresolved Issues, A.B.A. 
Center for Continuing Legal Education National Institute, Criminal Justice 
Section, Gaming Enforcement, Feb. 7-8 2002. Payments in lieu of taxes are not 
considered taxes because to be considered a tax against a tribe, a tax must be 
levied with “the power of sale and forfeiture” should the tribe fail to pay. See In 
re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760 (1866). 
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interest for the tribe because it has to relinquish control of its internal 
governance to pursue this form of economic development. 
This is not how Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation envisioned 
the trust relationship between the United States and tribes. The 
United States is the “great father” charged with protecting tribal 
inherent sovereignty since tribes “appeal to [the United States] for 
relief,” not the individual states.154 Seminole has forced tribes to 
depend on the states to compact in good faith in order to engage in 
Class III gaming since the IGRA’s enforcement mechanism has 
been deemed unconstitutional.155 This changes the sovereignty 
hierarchy from one where tribes enjoy greater sovereignty than 
states by being a domestic dependent nation whose pupilage is to the 
United States,156 to one where tribes are dependent on the individual 
state. The IGRA, and subsequent interpretations, have effectively 
delegated the tribe’s dependence on the United States to the 
individual states, similar to Public Law 280’s delegation of 
jurisdiction. 
There is no question that Congress intended to provide tribes 
with the superior bargaining position in compact negotiations 
through the IGRA’s good faith requirement.157 Although revenue 
sharing existed before the Seminole decision, tribes did not enter 
into the agreements out of requirement, but out of generosity. Now 
states often use revenue sharing as a prerequisite for substantive 
compact negotiations.158 This power play within each revenue 
sharing agreement causes tribes to discard a portion of their inherent 
sovereign authority in dictating how they choose to use gaming to 
achieve self-determination through economic development.159 
                                                                                                             
154 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831). 
155 See supra section III; see also PRUCHA, supra note 149, at 28–54. 
156 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2. 
157 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A), (d)(7)(A)(i), (d)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012). 
158 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 58–60. 
159 For example, the Pueblo of Pojoaque is currently enmeshed in a legal battle 
with the State of New Mexico in the Tenth Circuit because the State refuses to 
renegotiate the compact unless the Tribe agrees to increase the revenue sharing 
agreement from eight percent to ten percent. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico 
(10th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2187); Anne Minard, Pojoaque Tribe Says New Mexico 
is Bullying Them Into Higher Revenue Sharing Rate, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
MEDIA NETWORK (July 15, 2015), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/07/15/pojoaque-tribe-says-
new-mexico-bullying-them-higher-revenue-sharing-rate-161072. 
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States have created a new form of tribal dependency – one based on 
greed. This is contrary to the dependency, as the federal government 
views it, because state-caused dependency does not protect and 
assist tribal economic development as the “great father.”160 There is 
no question that Congress’s inability to restore the balance of power 
between tribes and states after Seminole represents a failure to act as 
the guardian for all tribes, as established by Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,161 despite appeasing the states after Cabazon by enacting 
the IGRA. 
What can be negotiated for at the bargaining table is not the only 
limitation on a tribe’s ability to pursue Class III gaming. The state’s 
constitution can also serve as an effective limitation as to what 
games the tribe can use for economic development.162 Indeed as 
stated by the Tenth Circuit, “[s]tate law must determine whether a 
state has validly bound itself to a compact.”163 Such a declaration is 
significant because the IGRA defines card games as Class II if they 
“are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played 
at any location in the State.”164 Because the state can refuse to 
compact if its constitution or laws prohibit specific games, tribes are 
dependent on the state to either amend its law or allow the tribe to 
engage in games that conflict with state law.165  
With many states outlawing or significantly limiting 
gambling,166 States remain in a powerful position to demand 
                                                                                                             
160 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2. 
161 Id. 
162 See generally Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). 
163 Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir. 1997). 
164 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II) (2012). 
165 See infra Part IV.C.; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d at 1043–44; See 
generally In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, the issue surrounded whether Texas Hold’em was to be construed as a 
Class II or Class III game. By citing IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20, the Court 
determined that it was not because “[g]ambling is contrary to public policy and 
is strictly prohibited” and exceptions for the lottery, pari-mutuel betting, bingo, 
and raffle charity games may not “employ any form of casino gambling 
including, but not limited to . . . poker.” 794 F.3d at 1043. Also of significance 
is that the Court refused to apply the Indian Canons of Construction to benefit 
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe since IDAHO CODE § 18-3801 provided a “statutory 
exemption for bona fide contests of skill, speed, strength or endurance” because 
such a reading would make the statute in conflict with the Idaho Constitution. 
Id. at 1043. 
166 See generally IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH 
CONST. art. VI, § 27; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, ch. 38, § 941–961 (West 2015). 
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revenue sharing agreements with tribes.167 Capitalization of this 
superior bargaining position does not equate to adequate 
consideration in a tribal economy because negotiations are not in 
good faith. Nor are they entered into out of a generous desire to help 
their tribal neighbors. Rather, compacts are the culmination of state 
greed and exploitation. This contravenes any foundation of kinship 
relationship between the state and the tribe because the compacting 
process is based on hostility and individualism and not building a 
cohesive community. States deny tribes the ability to steward its 
economic resources gained through Class III gaming because the 
State takes its percentage of net revenue before the tribe can account 
for tribal needs. The state denies the best interest of the tribe in 
negotiations and tribes try their damnedest to prevent the state from 
exploiting its weakened bargaining position. There simply is a 
failure to consider the best interest of both the tribe and state by both 
parties in an attempt to achieve a mutually beneficial arrangement. 
The hostility involved in compact negotiations makes tribes 
disinclined to act generously by sharing surplus monies with the 
state because of the disregard for the kinship-based economy.168 
 
C. Judicial Refusal to Accommodate and Amend Bad Faith 
Compacts 
 
Quite recently, the Ninth Circuit determined in Pauma Band of 
Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. 
California that a tribe cannot retrospectively challenge a revenue 
sharing agreement or any other fee arrangement in a compact 
                                                                                                             
167 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2012). Class III gaming is lawful if the tribe 
is “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity.” Id. 
168 This is not always true though. In Dalton v. Pataki, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that the IGRA preempted the State’s constitutional ban on 
commercial gambling and allowed the governor to enter compact negotiations 
because the state allowed regulated gambling. 855 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (2005). 
Furthermore, North Carolina has rejected the argument that 25 U.S.C. § 
2710(d)(1)(B)’s mandate requires the state to permit the same gaming 
opportunities for its citizens that is compacted for with the tribe. McCracken & 
Amick, Inc. v. Perdue, 687 S.E.2d 690, 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). See also CAL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 19.  
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“actually reached” between the state and tribe.169 The only remedy 
available to a tribe for a bad faith compact approved by the Secretary 
is rescission of the compact.170 Through the Pauma Band’s 
experience, it is evident that tribes do not receive adequate 
consideration. Good faith transactions within a kinship network 
require accommodation and a willingness to build off of and repair 
mistakes, not an arbitrary end to the agreement.171 Where compacts 
are devoid of these traditional facets of kinship, consideration in a 
tribal economic framework is absent. 
In 2000, the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians and over 
sixty other tribes in California signed nearly identical compacts due 
to fears that the Department of Justice would punish California 
tribes without compacts.172 Tribal fear was also due in part to the 
California Supreme Court’s holding that Proposition 5, a ballot 
approved statute that allowed compacts and Indian gaming, was 
unconstitutional because it violated Article IV, Section 19(e) of the 
California Constitution since it allowed casinos.173 California voters 
responded on March 7, 2000, by ratifying Proposition 1A, a 
constitutional amendment that exempted tribes from Section 19 and 
provided a “constitutionally protected monopoly [for tribes] on most 
types of Class III games.”174 
Because of the quagmire, the Pauma Band in April 2000 signed 
a compact negotiated in September 1999 because the compacts 
provided tribes licenses for specific games (such as slot machines) 
based on a mathematical formula.175 The Pauma court 
                                                                                                             
169 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. 
California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015). 
170 See id. at 1173. 
171 See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, 
AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1615-1815 IX–X (22nd printing, 
2009). 
172 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 813 F.3d at 1161; In re Indian 
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1103. 
173 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 813 F.3d at 1160-61; Hotel 
Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 1005 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. 1999). 
174 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d at 1161; In 
re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1103. 
175 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1161; for 
more information about the mathematics underlying licensing pool agreements, 
see Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty v. California, 
618 F.3d 1066, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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acknowledged that “[d]ue to the limited time the tribes had to 
negotiate with [California], the parties agreed to the 1999 Compact 
without ever discussing their radically different interpretations of 
how many licenses the statewide license pool formula actually 
produced.”176 In December 2003 California declared the license 
pool exhausted and the Pauma received only 200 of 750 requested 
slot machine licenses in the following draw.177 The Pauma 
successfully renegotiated the compact with California in 2004 for 
unlimited licenses.178 The Pauma and five other tribes amended their 
compacts with California to provide for an additional 22,500 slot 
machine licenses to be distributed outside the license limits 
contained in the 1999 Compacts.179 California only provided the 
Pauma with about 1,050 licenses each year, despite neighboring 
tribes each having a minimum of 2000 slot machine licenses and 
raised the annual fee from $315,000 to $7.75 million per year.180  
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that the Cachil Dehe Band of 
Wintun Indians were correct that California erred in the calculation 
of the amount of licenses available in December 2003.181 Shortly 
after, the Pauma filed a complaint that attacked the formation of the 
2004 Amendment under various theories, including mistake and 
misrepresentation.182 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that a 
misrepresentation of fact occurred because an additional 8,050 
licenses existed the license pool in December 2003.183  
The Pauma also argued that California negotiated in bad faith in 
all dealings during the prior fifteen years and requested the court to 
compel re-negotiation of the Amendment.184 The Court 
acknowledged that if California had properly represented the 
number of licenses available, the 2004 amendment “never would 
have been negotiated in the first place” but declined to compel 
California to re-enter negotiations since the 2004 Amendment was 
                                                                                                             
176 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1161. 
177 Id.  
178 Id. 
179 Cachil Dehe Band, 618 F.3d at 1072. 
180 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1162. 
181 Cachil Dehe Band, 618 F.3d at 1084–85. 
182 Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d 1155 at 
1162. 
183 Id. at 1166. 
184 Id. at 1171. 
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judicially rescinded.185 The Court also interpreted the IGRA to find 
that it forbids compelling a state to re-negotiate when bad faith 
negotiations occur because the IGRA’s remedies “simply do not 
apply when the state and the tribe have actually reached a 
Compact.”186  
For tribes, this secondary holding is catastrophic because a good 
faith assessment in a compact will only be determined as to primary 
negotiations where a state refuses to sign, not the subsequent 
negotiations or the actual terms of the compact. In other words, once 
the Secretary approves the compact, the compact is considered to 
have been negotiated in good faith. If bad faith is found after the 
state has signed, the court will only rescind the compact.  
The Pauma holding enshrines the idea that compacts do not 
require good faith dealing because while mistakes will always be 
made, rescission as the sole remedy removes the United States’ 
burden of compelling the states to fix mistakes and deal in good 
faith.187 This pushes tribes further from engaging in generous acts 
such as gifting surplus revenue to the state. Tribal ability to provide 
for its members also suffers because a state can manipulate the tribe 
to enter into a fraudulent compact and only fear that the compact 
will be judicially rescinded. The state does not have to worry about 
punishment from the United States; it only gambles on the tribe’s 
prospective economic contribution through revenue sharing. This is 
not how a proper kinship network in a tribal economy operates. 
 
V. THE DUBIOUSNESS OF SUBSTANTIAL EXCLUSIVITY 
 
There is no question that “[a] compact is a contract[, that] 
represents a bargained-for exchange between its signatories.”188 The 
IGRA’s compact process enables states to encumber tribal land 
subject to the Secretary and National Indian Gaming Commission’s 
(NIGC) approval because the compact requirement restricts tribal 
                                                                                                             
185 Id. at 1173. 
186 Id. 
187 See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, 
AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1615-1815 IX–X (22nd printing, 
2009). 
188 Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001). 
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use of its land.189 Both agencies are required by 25 U.S.C. § 81 to 
prevent the exchange of “dubious services . . . in exchange for 
enormous fees.”190  
The Secretary is required to approve any “agreement or contract 
with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or 
more years.”191 Only if the Secretary determines that the agreement 
does not fall within the statute’s scope does it not apply.192 Absent 
a specific statute, this standard applies to any service transaction 
involving Indian land that could lessen the land’s value.193 When a 
state “permits” a tribe to engage in Class III gaming,194 a service is 
involved because the state is not required to enter into compact 
negotiations and consents to the tribe’s engagement in Class III 
gaming to prevent the land from further depreciation in value.195  
Generally, substantial exclusivity arrangements are approved 
due to § 2710 (C)(vii)’s grant for negotiations to include anything 
“directly related to the operation of gaming activities” including 
“negative externalities.”196 Regardless of how the parties address 
the issues,197 the IGRA’s failure to address the limitations of the 
                                                                                                             
189 25 U.S.C. §§ 81(b), (f)(2). Subsection (f)(2) states that “Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to . . . amend or repeal the authority of the National 
Indian Gaming Commission under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.” 
Furthermore, 25 U.S.C. § 2711 expressly states for management contracts under 
the IGRA “[t]he authority of the Secretary under section 81 of this title, relating 
to management contracts regulated pursuant to this chapter, is hereby transferred 
to the [National Indian Gaming] Commission.  
190 Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 548 (1st Cir. 
1997). 
191 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (2012). 
192 Id. § 81(c). 
193 Penobscot Indian Nation, 112 F.3d at 550–51 (1st Cir. 1997); Wisconsin 
Winnebago Bus. Comm. v. Koberstein, 762 F.2d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Encumbrance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also A.K. 
Management Co. v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785, 786 
(9th Cir.1986). The critical word in § 81 is “services” because sales of goods are 
not included under the statue. U.S. ex rel. Steele v. Turn Key Gaming, Inc., 260 
F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2001). 
194 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). 
195 Id. at (d)(3)(B); supra Part III.; Permit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
196 Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v. 
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010 (citing In re Indian 
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
197 See id. 
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provision should place it within the protections of § 81.198 
Furthermore,  
 
Congress intended that there would be both federal 
and state review of gaming contracts; however, the 
two serve entirely separate functions. Federal 
approval is designed to ensure that the contracts 
tribes enter into are fair and reasonable. State 
compacts, however, are designed to protect the 
state’s taxing authority and police powers over 
gaming and are not designed to protect tribal 
interests.199 
 
Because of this, § 81 requires both the Secretary and the NIGC 
to protect tribes from “improvident[,] unconscionable” and illusory 
compact provisions.200 This duty includes protection from 
substantial exclusivity arrangements because they often are an 
illusory service used as consideration for enormous fees under the 
guise of revenue sharing agreements.201 
This section will first discuss the economic benefits states often 
receive in addition to revenue sharing. Second, this section will 
analyze the illusory nature of substantial exclusivity and how it 
contrasts with tribal economics. Finally, this section explores how 
revenue sharing arrangements in New York, Oklahoma, California, 
and California both conform and contrast to tribal economics. This 
analysis shows that the state is the primary beneficiary under 
substantial exclusivity provisions and their inherent bad faith nature 
makes them inadequate for consideration in tribal economics. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
198 See Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531 F.3d 767, 
786 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plain language of § 2710(b)(2)(A) does not 
establish a § 81 duty within a contract between a tribe and a third party). 
199 Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 547 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 
2008) (emphasis added). 
200 In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 227 (1893); United States v. Colville, No. 
2:97CV330-C, 1998 WL 1818928, 6 (W.D.N.C. June 23, 1998). 
201 Also of note is that 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(B)’s requirement of Secretary 
approval regardless of the length of the compact supersedes 25 U.S.C. § 81(b)’s 
requirement that approval is necessary only for contracts entered into for over 
seven years. 
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A. Gaming Provides the State with Inherent Economic Benefits 
 
After Seminole, states began to demand concessions including 
profits, treaty rights, endowments, and flat fee payments.202 In 2012, 
revenue sharing provided the states an estimated $1.5 billion influx 
of capital.203 This staggering number is caused in part due to many 
tribes not having alternative resources to appease state greed.204 
Indeed, states that insist on revenue sharing reject the inherent 
generosity tribes provide through economic stimulation for rural and 
some urban markets. This hinders a practicable kinship network 
within a cooperative federalism framework because revenue sharing 
preempts any chance of equivocal exchange between the two 
sovereigns.  
At least three reasons demonstrate the positive impacts gaming 
has on neighboring off-reservation communities, especially in rural 
areas. First, people who travel to the facility from outside the 
immediate region to engage with the gaming facility makes it a 
regional economic asset because of the inevitable tax revenue the 
state gains from purchases of goods and services by the visitors.205 
Second, gaming provides employment opportunities for the local, 
regional, and reservation locales which provides an economic 
stimulus in generally impoverished regions.206 Third, gaming 
revenue is not subject to the global economy because it stays within 
the tribe’s governing jurisdiction allowing the tribe to reinvest 
revenue for tribal and regional development adding further benefit 
to the state.207  
                                                                                                             
202 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 59. 
203 Randall K. Q. Akee, et al., The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects 
on American Indian Economic Development, 29 THE J. OF ECON. PERSP. 185, 
201 (2015). 
204 See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 
at 218–221 (stating that the tribe did not have natural resources and was 
dependent on bingo enterprise). 
205 Akee, et al., supra note 203, at 201. 
206 Id. at 202. One sixteen-year study that encompassed over 100 communities 
found that communities near an Indian gaming facility experienced a reduction 
in employment in part due to the increased employment opportunities. Id. at 
200. 
207 Id. 
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Class III gaming provides the state with additional benefits that 
provide the state with residual economic benefits.208 For example, 
gaming tribes tend to invest in education, health services, and other 
social programs to improve the standard of living on the 
reservations.209 Crime rates decrease which lessens the capital 
necessary for policing the reservation. This particularly benefits 
Public Law 280 states that exercise criminal jurisdiction.210 Studies 
have shown that “association with a tribe with Class III gaming 
leads to higher income, fewer risky behaviors, better physical health, 
and perhaps increased access to health care.”211 Some states have 
acknowledged these inherent benefits. For example, in 2015 the 
Idaho Department of Labor attributed the Coeur d’Alene Resort in 
Worley, Idaho as stimulating tourism and population growth that 
caused an increase in construction, retail sales, health care, services, 
and government jobs for Kootenai County.212 
Despite the socioeconomic benefits gaming provides, states 
often require revenue sharing agreements that forego the tribe’s 
ability to steward revenue and further invest for regional 
development. In a kinship-based economy, tribes would be highly 
compelled to assist the states in roadway development, crime 
prevention, and further forms of economic development because 
both parties benefit and would keep the relationship non-adversarial. 
This would allow the state and tribe to focus on equivocal exchanges 
based on the economic stimulation the tribe provides through its 
gaming facility and the state-provided services. The relationship 
would foster trust and fair dealing rather than greed, mistrust, and 
                                                                                                             
208 See generally KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN 
GAMING LAW AND POLICY 140–143 (2006). 
209 James I. Schaap, The Growth of the Native American Gaming Industry: What 
Has the Past Provided, and What Does the Future Hold?, 34 AM. IND. Q. 365, 
375 (2010). 
210 Id; see also RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE 
POLITICS OF TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 100 (2005). 
211 Barbara Wolfe, et al., The Income and Health Effects of Tribal Casino 
Gaming on American Indians, 49 DEMOGRAPHY, 499, 520 (2012). 
212 Samuel Wolkenhaur, Workforce Trends, Kootenai County, IDAHO DEPT. OF 
LABOR (Dec. 2015), 
https://labor.idaho.gov/publications/lmi/pubs/KootenaiProfile.pdf. The author 
does not intend to make these correlations absolute because many tribal casinos 
have failed. 
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skepticism. Yet, this does not occur as seen by substantial 
exclusivity’s illusory nature. 
 
B. The Illusory Nature of Substantial Exclusivity Terms 
 
Only the Ninth Circuit has attempted to draw the line between 
when substantial exclusivity provides a substantial economic benefit 
and when it is an illusory term.213 The court determined that the 
California Constitution automatically provided tribes exclusivity 
and thus could not be considered as part of negotiations.214 In 
rejecting a holistic analysis of the compact and looking at the 
provision in isolation, the court determined the exclusivity 
agreement illusory because California conceded nothing beyond 
what the California Constitution provided.215 The court did not 
consider how California could amend its Constitution to remove 
exclusivity at any time.216 This shows that the California 
Constitution promises tribes nothing because California voters at 
any time can issue a constitutional amendment eradicating 
exclusivity. In no way can a voidable compact term that ends 
revenue sharing at the tribe’s expense be deemed a detriment 
suffered by the state.217 
Voidable terms are not good faith terms within tribal economics. 
First, the lack of certainty contravenes the basic notion that a 
community-based relationship requires understanding that both 
sovereigns will perform as the terms require. Second, tribes do not 
gain any benefit other than permission to engage in Class III 
                                                                                                             
213 Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v. 
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d at 1037. 
214 Id. at 1040. 
215 Id. at 1037, 1040. After court mandated arbitration, the Secretary approved 
the compact that accounted for the event of California abrogating exclusivity in 
which the tribe would have the right to continue gaming under the compact and 
payments owed to the State would be renegotiated, thus making the term 
voidable. Tribal-State Compact, Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians-Cal., §12.4, 
compact approved Feb. 8, 2013. 
216 For more information regarding California’s Constitution, see supra Part 
IV.C. 
217 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 85 (1981) (stating that “a promise to 
perform all or part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, previously 
voidable by him, but not avoided prior to the making of the promise is 
binding.”) 
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gaming.218 Third, the tribe’s sovereign right to determine surplus 
revenue is revoked because states take their percentage of revenue 
from net revenues, not surplus funds. Finally, the illusory nature of 
substantial exclusivity makes such terms devoid of good faith 
because the state can open non-tribal land to non-Indian competition 
at any time.219 In such circumstances the state will not suffer a true 
consequence because revenue gained by state regulation would 
likely off-set the loss of tribal revenue through revenue sharing and 
tribes would be forced to address increased competition.  
The Department of the Interior has determined that substantial 
exclusivity in return for revenue sharing confers on tribes a 
“substantial economic benefit.”220 While the state must agree to an 
economic disadvantage, the state retains the option of performance. 
Through the terms of the compact, the state has no requirement to 
maintain exclusivity since there is no duration attached to the term. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines an illusory 
promise as “[w]ords of promise which by their terms make 
performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor.’”221 For an 
illustration, the Restatement provides the following example: 
 
A promises B to act as B’s agent for three years from 
a future date on certain terms; B agrees that A may 
so act, but reserves the power to terminate the 
agreement at any time. B’s agreement is not 
consideration, since it involves no promise by 
him.222 
 
Substantial exclusivity agreements are analogous to the 
Restatement’s example. First, the tribe promises the state to provide 
revenue sharing for the duration of the compact for the term of 
substantial exclusivity. The state agrees to this arrangement but 
reserves the right to terminate exclusivity at any time and terminate 
the revenue sharing agreement. Therefore, there is no consideration 
                                                                                                             
218 Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v. 
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d at 1040. (The “IGRA entitles tribes to negotiate for 
basic Class III gaming rights without being forced to accept revenue sharing.”) 
219 See 18 U.S.C. §1151 (2012). 
220 See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary – Indian 
Affairs, to Honorable Russell Begaye, President, Navajo Nation (June 9, 2015). 
221 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §77 (1981). 
222 Id.  
 
 
 
2016] Money is for Nothing  205 
 
 
because the state does not promise the tribe to ensure that exclusivity 
will remain for the duration of the compact. There is nothing 
resembling good faith in this arrangement; it is merely a mythic 
creation that the Secretary has deemed a legitimate economic 
detriment to the state. It does not promote stewardship of economic 
resources or trade on mutual achievement. The state merely 
promises the tribe nothing, shrouds the agreement in uncertainty, 
and forces tribes to pay the state substantial amounts of revenue to 
pursue gaming for economic development.   
The Secretary continues to assert that substantial exclusivity 
provides a “substantial economic benefit” for tribes despite their 
illusory nature.223 Therefore, the Secretary’s actions are arguably a 
breach of the duty imposed by 25 U.S.C. § 81.224 The mere 
requirement that a compact defines how the term expires essentially 
serves as a rubber stamp of the agreement and a breach of the 
Secretary’s duty.225 Indeed as the Michigan Court of Appeals stated 
in response to a revenue sharing in exchange for exclusivity 
arrangement, “[t]he state gave nothing in exchange for the 
payments.”226 Despite this understanding, the Secretary continues to 
allow the practice to continue. 
 
C. Revenue Sharing, Substantial Exclusivity, and Tribal Economics 
 
Revenue sharing agreements provide the state a windfall of 
capital that is not always used for the betterment of the reservation 
and the surrounding community. For instance, in 1993, several tribes 
agreed with Michigan to provide the State with “semiannual 
payments of eight percent of certain gaming revenue [for] the 
exclusive right to conduct specified gaming activities in the 
state.”227 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Michigan issued a consent judgment that approved the agreement 
                                                                                                             
223 See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to 
Honorable Raymond Loretto, Governor of the Pueblo of Jemez (June 9, 2015). 
224 See cases cited supra note 200. 
225 See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to 
Honorable Deval Patrick, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
(Oct. 12, 2012).  
226 Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc. v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996). 
227 Id. at 9. 
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and the parties agreed to compacts that same day.228 By 1996, the 
Michigan Strategic Fund, where the payments were delivered, 
accumulated $26,098,551.18 from the tribes.229 Rather than 
reinvesting that money within the reservation regions for the 
betterment of the tribes and surrounding locales to stimulate 
economic development, the State used the revenue to fund a grant 
for the construction of Comerica Park in Detroit.230 In hearing a case 
about whether the tribal revenues were appropriations, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals declared the revenue the result of “gratuitous 
payments negotiated by the Governor.”231 This highlights one of the 
critical issues with revenue sharing agreements; the states are not 
limited on their use of the funds. Unlike tribes who are required by 
the IGRA to use net revenue in defined ways,232 states are not 
limited in their use of the funds. Actions such as Michigan’s 
demonstrate a general refusal to gift the tribal community and 
surrounding region with the improvements necessary for further 
economic development. Substantial exclusivity does not provide the 
tribe with adequate consideration because states can use the revenue 
in manners that reject the building of a kinship relationship between 
the state and tribe. 
Not all states are the same, and some more than others compact 
closer to good faith to facilitate the growth and development of a 
kinship relationship with tribes. It is, therefore, appropriate to 
discuss a cross-section of compact requirements from New York, 
Oklahoma, California, and Idaho. Through this, discussion attempts 
to illustrate how the states either attempt to embrace tribal 
economics or abjectly refuse it.  
 
                                                                                                             
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 10. Comerica Park is the home of the Detroit Tigers of Major League 
Baseball and replaced the iconic Tiger Stadium in 2000. 
231 Id. at 13. The use of Class III gaming revenue by states is not isolated to 
Michigan. In 2001, Wisconsin allocated $1.5 million for revenue sharing funds 
for the construction of the Resch Center in Ashwaubenon, Wisconsin. W.S. 
Miller & Chad LeBlanc, Bingo?: An Overview of the Potential Legal Issues 
Arising from the Use of Indian Gaming Revenues to Fund Professional Sports 
Facilities, 19 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, 121, 130 (2009). 
232 See sources cited supra note 15. 
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1. New York 
 
New York entered into its first tribal-state compact with the 
Oneida Indian Nation in 1993.233 The State did not require the 
Oneida to provide a revenue sharing agreement and assessed the 
tribe only for the “reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the 
State in regulating gaming under this compact.”234 This requirement 
comported with tribal economics because not only did the compact 
define what the costs could consist of;235 it included in good faith a 
provision for dispute resolution if the Tribe disagreed with the 
State’s accounting.236 New York abandoned this successful method 
of dealing in 2002 and began requiring revenue sharing agreements 
with tribes. 
In 2002, New York compacted with the Seneca Nation and 
provided the Tribe with exclusive rights in a 10,500 square mile 
geographic area in Western New York.237 In return, the Tribe was 
required to provide the State with eighteen percent of the “net drop” 
for the first four years, twenty-two percent for the next three years, 
and then twenty-five percent for the remaining six years of the 
compact.238 This exclusivity agreement could have affected the 
Tuscarora Indian Nation and the Tonawanda Band of Seneca 
Indians whose reservations lie within the exclusivity range.239 To 
account for the potential infringement on the Tuscarora and 
Tonawanda, the Seneca Nation and New York negotiated an 
exception.240 New York would not breach the compact should it 
compact with the Tuscarora and Tonawanda for games the Seneca 
Nation enjoys.241 New York also agreed to prevent any tribe from 
                                                                                                             
233 Tribal-State Compact, Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.-N.Y., (1993) (compact 
approved June 4, 1993). 
234 Id. at §§ 10(b), app. D(b). 
235 Id. at § app. D. 
236 Id. at § app. D(f). Such procedures are fairly customary in compacts. 
237 Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 12(a) (2002) 
(compact approved Nov. 12, 2002). 
238 Id. at § 12(b)(1). The compact defined net drop as “money dropped into 
machines, after payout but before expense.” Id. 
239 Id. at § 12(a)(2). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. If New York does negotiate with the other tribes, the Seneca Nation does 
not have to provide the State revenue for the games the tribes compact for. Id. at 
§12(a)(4). 
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opening a gaming establishment within twenty-five miles of an 
operating Seneca Nation casino unless that tribe had trust land 
within that radius as of August 2, 2002.242 The Seneca Nation 
estimated that despite the exceptions, the compact would provide 
the Tribe with a gaming enterprise worth over $5 billion and provide 
the State with over $1 billion.243  
Upon review, the Secretary noted the disregard for kinship 
relations by pointing to the exception and stated his concern that the 
Seneca Nation’s exclusivity could limit the other tribes’ economic 
opportunities.244 Yet, the Secretary determined that the compact did 
not violate the trust relationship because: 1) the Tuscarora and 
Tonawanda could pursue Class III gaming on reservation land; 2) 
they did not have an inherent right to pursue off-reservation gaming; 
and, 3) were each traditionally opposed to gaming.245 The Secretary 
did not condone exclusivity and warned against future compacts 
“pitting tribes against one another.”246 
New York also provided the Seneca Nation additional 
substantial economic benefits by gifting it use of the State’s eminent 
domain power, the ability to build two off-reservation casinos in the 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls market, and sold the Niagara Falls 
Convention Center to the Tribe for one dollar.247 The Secretary 
approved the compact because of these additional benefits.248 While 
the perks in addition to the exclusivity range can be construed as 
gifts, the lack of disregard of existing kinship relations for monetary 
gain is problematic.  
Also problematic is that the New York Supreme Court severed 
the Tribe’s eminent domain power from the compact if Buffalo 
refused to allow for a casino because it violated separation of powers 
                                                                                                             
242 Id. If this subsection of the compact is breached by New York, the Seneca 
Nation can end all revenue sharing payments. 
243 Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec. of the Interior, to The Honorable Cyrus 
Schindler, Seneca Nation President (Nov. 12, 2002). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id.; see also Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 11, 
(2002), (compact approved Nov. 12, 2002). 
248 Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to The Honorable 
Cyrus Schindler, Seneca Nation President (Nov. 12, 2002). 
 
 
 
2016] Money is for Nothing  209 
 
 
principles under the New York Constitution.249 The State and the 
Tribe did not renegotiate the compact’s substantial exclusivity 
because the Tribe eventually opened casinos in both Buffalo and 
Niagara Falls.250 This example of the court modifying compact 
clauses shows that substantial economic benefits are not necessarily 
guaranteed and causes uncertainty for the tribe. 
Despite the Seneca Nation’s economic success, the compact 
shows New York’s willingness to disregard kinship relations with 
non-gaming tribes in exchange for economic benefits. As Secretary 
Norton indirectly expressed, the limits substantial exclusivity places 
on non-gaming tribes strains intertribal kinship relations. New York 
did attempt to improve kinship relations between the State and 
Seneca Nation through the convention center, use of eminent 
domain power, and ability to pursue off-reservation gaming. But to 
be frank, these notions do not appear to be in good faith. It appears 
that New York desires to capitalize from Class III gaming because 
the IGRA preempts the New York Constitution’s prohibition on 
commercial gambling.251 Apparently, New York sought to exploit 
the IGRA’s loophole by creating a sense of certainty that it will reap 
the benefits of Class III gaming by minimizing competition, the 
exclusivity range, and the two off-reservation casinos in major 
markets. This shows that greed, rather than generous exchange for 
the betterment of all, appears to be the primary motivation. The 
notion of greed being the driving force behind substantial 
exclusivity is evident because New York is paid its revenue before 
the Tribe can define surplus revenue.252 The New York model is not 
                                                                                                             
249 Huron Grp., Inc. v. Pataki, 785 N.Y.S.2d 827, 854, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
aff’d, 23 A.D.3d 1051 (2005). 
250 Overview: Seneca Gaming Corp., THE SENECA NATION, 
http://www.senecagamingcorporation.com/overview.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016). 
251 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; Dalton v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (N.Y. 
2005). 
252 Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 12(b)(1) (2002) 
(compact approved Nov. 12, 2002). It is worth noting however, that the Seneca 
Nation’s parcel of land in Buffalo has been a source of contention for years 
despite the Secretary deeming the land sufficient to meet the IGRA’s 
requirements. See Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Chaudhuri, 
802 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2015) petition for cert. filed, case no. 15-780, Dec. 16, 
2015. In 2010, New York attempted to enter into a very similar compact with 
the Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band of Mohican Indians. In return for 
twenty-five percent revenue, the tribe was to receive exclusivity rights to New 
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representative of adequate consideration in a tribal economy. New 
York replaces good faith, generosity, and kinship by greed driven 
implications designed to maximize its own take with minimal regard 
for other tribes. 
 
2. Oklahoma 
 
By statute, Oklahoma refuses to allow for tribal economics by 
requiring tribes to accept and acknowledge to the Secretary that the 
adhesion compact provides substantial exclusivity.253 Tribes are 
required to provide Oklahoma: 
 
four percent (4%) of the first Ten Million Dollars 
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues 
received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play 
of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanza-
style bingo games and electronic instant bingo 
games, 
 
five percent (5%) of the next Ten Million Dollars 
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues 
received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play 
of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanza-
style bingo games and electronic instant bingo 
games, 
 
six percent (6%) of all subsequent adjusted gross 
revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from 
the play of electronic amusement games, electronic 
bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant 
bingo games, and 
                                                                                                             
York City’s five boroughs, Long Island, and the Catskill Mountains in Upstate 
New York. Tribal-State Compact, Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band of 
Mohican Indians-N.Y., § 15, (2010), compact disapproved Feb. 18, 2011. The 
Secretary denied the compact because it would limit the trust lands use solely to 
gaming and did not issue an opinion about the revenue sharing agreement. Letter 
from Donald Lavendure, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs, 
to Honorable Kimberly M. Vele, President, Stockbridge-Munsee Community 
Band of Mohican Indians (Feb. 18, 2011). It is also worth noting that this 
agreement would have made New York and the Stockbridge-Munsee direct 
competitors with Connecticut, the Mohegan Indian Tribe, and the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
253 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, §§ 280, 281 (West 2015). 
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ten percent (10%) of the monthly net win of the 
common pool(s) or pot(s) from which prizes are paid 
for nonhouse-banked card games. The tribe is 
entitled to keep an amount equal to state payments 
from the common pool(s) or pot(s) as part of its cost 
of operating the games.254 
 
Oklahoma defines substantial exclusivity as the State refusing 
non-Indian gaming to expand in games or locations as of 2004.255 
Tribes are required to continue revenue sharing with the State should 
exclusivity be breached.256 The entity that operates in contravention 
to substantial exclusivity is punished and must provide the State “no 
less than fifty percent of any increase in the entities’ adjusted gross 
revenues.”257 Tribes within forty-five miles of the entity are entitled 
to “as liquidated damages . . . [a] pro rata [share] based on the 
number of covered game machines operated by each Eligible Tribe 
in the time period when such adjusted gross revenues were 
generated.”258 
Further illustrating Oklahoma’s façade of good faith dealings 
with tribes is how the State places twelve percent of gaming revenue 
in the State’s General Revenue Fund and the remaining eighty-eight 
percent into the Education Reform Revolving Fund.259 Oklahoma 
denies tribes any say in how the funds will be used. Although the 
statute rejects tribal input to determine for itself what its surplus 
funds are and then give a gift to the State, the true lack of 
consideration is found in the inherent failure to deal in good faith 
through the adhesion compact.  
Oklahoma refuses to provide good faith negotiations because it 
could subsidize non-tribal gaming expansion since the statutory 
remedy for breach of exclusivity does not injure the State. This is 
not proper accommodation in a tribal economy because while the 
State does not suffer a consequence through the breach the tribe is 
                                                                                                             
254 Id. at § 281(11)(A)(2). 
255 Id. at § 281(11)(E). 
256 Id. at § 281(11)(E). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at § 280, 281(11)(E). The first $20,833.33 of all fees received are used 
“for the treatment of compulsive gambling disorder and educational programs 
related to such disorder.” Id. at § 280. 
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still required to provide revenue sharing. Only if the State and tribe 
agree to end revenue sharing if Oklahoma strikes the statutory 
exclusivity of games will the Secretary approve Oklahoma 
compacts.260 Nothing addresses Oklahoma’s domination over 
negotiations and refusal to accept consequences if the compact is 
breached.  
Oklahoma compels tribes to abandon the building of a kinship 
network with the State and neighboring tribes. Any tribe that refuses 
to accept the model compact’s insignificant benefits “could [be 
placed] at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis those tribes that will 
be authorized to offer Class III games.”261 This is not consideration 
within a tribal economy. Negotiations are devoid of good faith, 
generosity is absent, and the tribes realize revenue after the State. 
Oklahoma’s greed continues to dominate as technology expands the 
range tribal offerings of Class III gaming.262  
 
3. California 
 
The vast majority of legal authority regarding substantial 
exclusivity agreements derives from California. While this article 
previously discussed the history of California’s process,263 the 
Secretary construes the exclusivity provided by the California 
Constitution as a substantial economic benefit contingent on the 
tribe’s primary economic market.264 As demonstrated earlier, 
                                                                                                             
260 See Letter from Michael D. Olsen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary – 
Indian Affairs, to Honorable Chad Smith, Principal Chief, Cherokee Nation 
(Dec. 28, 2004). 
261 See Letter from Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary – Policy and Economic 
Development to Honorable LeRoy Howard, Chief, Seneca Cayuga Tribe of 
Oklahoma (Jan. 6, 2006). The date stamped on the letter is probably incorrect as 
to the year. It was most likely written in 2005 because the compact at issue 
became active and published in the Federal Register on March 7, 2015. 70 Fed. 
Reg. 11027. 
262 See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs to 
Honorable Janice Prairie Chief-Boswell, Governor, Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes 
(Aug. 1, 2013). In this letter, the Secretary of the Interior denied the Cheyenne-
Arapaho’s compact with Oklahoma because it would have provided Oklahoma a 
twenty percent revenue share for the right to operate wireless gaming without 
providing the Tribe any additional substantial economic benefit as to its 
governing compact based on the Oklahoma statute. 
263 See supra Part IV.C.  
264CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Secretary – Indian 
Affairs, to Honorable Leona Williams, Chairperson, Pinoleville Pomo Nation 
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substantial exclusivity is illusory despite being construed as a 
voidable term.265 California realized this before the Pauma court’s 
secondary holding that courts will only rescind a compact rather 
than compel negotiations.266 For example, in California’s compact 
with the Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians, 
the Tribe’s only remedies should the State breach the exclusivity 
requirement by amending the California Constitution are: 
 
(1) Terminate this Compact, in which case the Tribe 
will lose the right to operate Gaming Devices and 
other Class III Gaming authorized by this Compact; 
or 
 
(2) Continue under this Compact.267 
 
The Secretary did not respond to this illusory provision.268 
Needless to say, the Fort Independence Paiute has no true remedy 
should California breach the exclusivity provision.  
Similarly, but not nearly as drastic, the Coyote Valley Band of 
Pomo Indians and California amended their compact in 2012. The 
amendment provides that should exclusivity cease, the Tribe could 
either terminate the compact or continue operations. If the Tribe 
continues operations, it will not provide revenue contributions, it 
will continue compensating the State for regulatory costs, and have 
a maximum of 1,100 gaming devices.269 It is evident that regardless 
                                                                                                             
(Feb. 9, 2012). The Secretary was reluctant to approve the revenue sharing 
agreement because the Tribe sits in a “highly competitive but sparsely 
populated” market and competitor tribes were subject to a ten percent revenue 
sharing into the Special Distribution Fund for having 751-900 gaming devices. 
The Pomo are subjected to a fifteen percent revenue sharing agreement. Despite 
this discrepancy, the Secretary approved the agreement because the Tribe 
probably would not have that many devices and did not consider the discrepancy 
in its determination. 
265 See supra Part V.B.  
266 See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text. 
267 Tribal-State Compact, Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute 
Indians-California, § 4.6 (2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg. 
3241). 
268 79 Fed. Reg. 3241–42 (2014). 
269 Amended Tribal-State Compact, Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians-
California, § 15.4 (2012) (compact approved and published 77 Fed. Reg. 
76514). 
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of the purported remedies, California refuses to provide adequate 
consideration within tribal economics.  
First, both examples demonstrate the lack of negotiations 
because both the Fort Independence Paiute and the Coyote Valley 
Pomo are required to sacrifice sovereignty to pursue Class III 
gaming through their highly limited forms of recourse. California’s 
potential breach of exclusivity restrains tribes from expanding its 
gaming enterprise for the betterment of its community. It is likely 
that a tribe will continue under the compact’s restrictions to enjoy 
the economic benefits of Class III gaming. Second, there is no sense 
of community, particularly in the Paiute’s compact, because the 
State will not hesitate to charge a tribe more than competitor tribes 
for gaming devices.270 Finally, and most significant, California 
receives its share of gaming revenue before the tribe can determine 
what revenue is surplus and use their revenue as a gift for either the 
State or other tribes. A forced gifting is not a true gift in tribal 
economics. 
California’s revenue sharing agreements have long been 
contentious issues in the Ninth Circuit.271 To briefly summarize, 
tribes are generally required to provide a percentage of net gaming 
revenue to two State funds, the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) 
and the Special Distribution Fund (SDF).272 
California allocates funds to all non-gaming tribes who do not 
partake in gaming funds paid into the RSTF by tribes.273 The typical 
allocation for non-gaming tribes is $1.1 million per year and 
California does exempt gaming tribes who have smaller gaming 
enterprises.274 Exemptions exist through a graduated contribution 
                                                                                                             
270 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
271 See generally Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon 
Reservation v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Indian 
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); Artichoke Joe’s California Grand 
Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994). 
272 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105. The SDF is also known as the 
“Tribal Nation Grant Fund.” 
273 Id.; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.75 (West). 
274 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; Tribal-State Compact, Fort 
Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians-California, §§ 5.1–5.2 
(2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg. 3241). 
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dependent on how many gaming devices the tribe operates and 
valuation attached on each gaming device.275  
The SDF contains a similar graduated cost contingent on the 
number of gaming devices but requires a percentage of net wins 
rather than a fixed number.276 Funds paid into the SDF are mandated 
by statute to follow an order or priority that removes direct tribal 
input. The order is as follows: 
 
(1) An appropriation to the Indian Gaming Revenue 
Sharing Trust Fund in an aggregate amount sufficient 
to make payments of any shortfalls that may occur in 
the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund. 
 
(2) An appropriation to the Office of Problem and 
Pathological Gambling within the State Department 
of Alcohol and Drug Programs for problem gambling 
prevention programs. 
 
(3) The amount appropriated in the annual Budget 
Act for allocation between the Department of Justice 
and the California Gambling Control Commission 
for regulatory functions that directly relates to Indian 
gaming. 
 
(4) An appropriation for the support of local 
government agencies impacted by tribal gaming.277 
 
Both funds have been determined consistent with the IGRA 
because the parties chose those methods to deal with consequences 
relating to opportunity and compensation “directly related to the 
operation of gaming activities.”278 However, both funds do not 
provide adequate consideration in tribal economics considering the 
                                                                                                             
275 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; see also Tribal-State Compact, 
Pinoleville Pomo Nation-Cal., § 5.2(a)(2011) (compact approved and published 
77 Fed. Reg. 5566). 
276 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; Amended Tribal-State 
Compact, Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians-California, § 4.3.1(a)(1) (2012) 
(compact approved and published 77 Fed. Reg. 76514). 
277 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.85 (West). 
278 In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1114 (quoting 25 U.S.C. 
2710(3)(C)(vii) (internal quotations omitted); see also Rincon Band of Luiseno 
Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1033 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
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duress many tribes were under when the compacts that began the 
process were entered into.279 Tribes have no say in how funds are 
distributed, especially under the SDF. The RSTF denies gaming 
tribes the ability to fashion kinship relations with neighboring tribes. 
The State has assumed the position of a father to all tribes rather than 
a partner in the community.  
Recently, California has taken a domineering position that 
rejects a proper kinship relationship in its compact with the North 
Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California.280 First, the compact 
required the North Fork to provide “mitigation” to the Chukchansi 
Indian Tribe by not installing a hotel until 2018 and provide 
payment into the RSTF equal to the Chukchansi’s payment into the 
RSTF.281 Second, upon the initiation of actual gaming or January 1, 
2016, the North Fork was required to provide a certain percentage 
of net wins dependent on overall net win into the SDF and payment 
to the Chukchansi would cease.282 Finally, the North Fork was 
required to pay into a trust account for the Wiyot Tribe determined 
by a graduated percentage of net win.283 The Wiyot compacted to 
relinquish their right to pursue Class III gaming to ensure retrieval 
of payments.284  
The Secretary did not comment on the North Fork’s compact 
that contained the California Constitution’s automatic grant of 
exclusivity.285 In 2014, California voters refused to ratify the North 
Fork and Wiyot’s compacts through Proposition 48. Since then the 
State has refused to recognize the compact’s existence or reenter 
negotiations.286 The referendum vote has also caused the compact to 
be deemed unenforceable.287 Even though unenforceable, the 
                                                                                                             
279 See supra Part IV.C. 
280 Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.-Cal., 
(2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649). 
281 Id. at §§ 4.5(a)–(b). The Chukchansi was then to be reimbursed for its 
payment into the RSTF through the SDF. 
282 Id. at § 4.5(c). 
283 Id. at § 5.2(a). 
284 Id.; Tribal-State Compact, Wiyot Tribe-Cal. (2013) (compact approved and 
published 78 Fed. Reg.54908–9). 
285 Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.-Cal., § 
4.9 (2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649). 
286 North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal. v. California, No. 1:15-cv-
00419-AWI-SAB, at. 5–6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (order on cross-motions for 
judgment on the pleadings). 
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exclusivity arrangement was illusory because the State could breach 
the provision and not suffer consequence.288  
It appears that California is not interested in helping make a 
community where tribes are able to interact, trade, and communicate 
with one another freely. The State seems fixated on dividing tribes 
to maximize profit for its own gain. Even in the North Fork’s case, 
absent the payments to the Wiyot, the tribe would have been 
required to pay into the SDF and RSTF.289 Even if the North Fork 
are compelled to pursue gaming because of greed, the Tribe should 
have the ability to steward its revenue. The Tribe should be allowed 
to exercise its inherent sovereignty by declaring funds surplus and 
then generously contribute to the neighboring tribes and California. 
California did not compact to provide the North Fork with a gift by 
compacting; it attempted to limit the Wiyot, Chukchansi, and North 
Fork’s sovereignty by not allowing the Tribes to work together. This 
is not representative of a community built on accommodation; this 
is division and greed. 
 
4. Idaho 
 
Idaho appears to be using revenue sharing arrangements with 
Class III gaming tribes for the development of kinship relations and 
building of a good faith relationship despite substantial exclusivity 
being inherent in the Idaho Constitution.290 What appears to be 
typical revenue sharing agreements are actually provisions that 
compel the tribe to donate five percent of all net revenue for 
educational purposes.291 Before 2002, only the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
was subject to such a provision because the Tribe itself insisted in 
good faith that the provision be included.292 The Tribe and the State 
agreed that: 
                                                                                                             
288 See Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.-
Cal., § 4.9 (2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649). 
289 Id. at §§ 4.5, 5.2. 
290 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20. 
291 Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene Tribe-Idaho., § 20.2 (1992) (compact 
approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 8478). 
292 Chief Allen, Opinion, Tribe’s Education Funding Above Reproach, COEUR 
D’ALENE PRESS (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
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The gaming operation shall contribute five percent 
(5%) of net revenues from authorized Class III 
gaming for the financial support of education. This 
sum is to be divided equally between Tribal and 
public education in the region on or near the 
reservation. The Tribe may elect to contribute 
additional sums for these or other educational 
purposes. Disbursements of these funds shall be at 
the sole discretion of the Tribe.293 
 
Idaho allows for a kinship relationship to develop between itself 
and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because it allows the Tribe to be 
generous with its revenue for the benefit of both tribal members and 
Idahoans. This arrangement allows the Tribe to steward its revenue 
without State interference thus promoting interdependence that 
benefits all involved. 
Before 2002, the only other similar provision that existed in 
Idaho was with the Kootenai Tribe.294 What distinguished that 
arrangement from typical revenue sharing agreements is that the 
Kootenai had the option of contributing up to 2.5% of revenue “for 
the financial support of local government programs, hospitals, 
education or other purposes as deemed by the [Tribal] Council.”295 
Idaho could not compel the Kootenai to donate any funds for any 
specific purpose. This further fostered the growth of generous 
exchange in a kinship-based economy.  
Through the passage of Proposition 1 in 2002, Idaho codified the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s provision that the Tribe shall donate five 
percent of net revenue for local education on and near the 
reservation as a condition precedent for a compact to be amended to 
include video gaming.296 Both the Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes, 
who were not previously required to donate for educational 
purposes, agreed to this condition to make video gaming an 
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293 Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene Tribe-Idaho., § 20.2 (1992) (compact 
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approved Class III game.297 It is evident that the Coeur d’Alene’s 
good faith compelled Idaho to expand the games available for Class 
III gaming. Idaho allows tribes to decide if it wants to provide 
benefits to their neighbors by agreeing to accommodate the 
expansion of tribal economies.  
Despite the Coeur d’Alene, Kootenai, and Nez Perce Tribes 
working with Idaho for the benefit of all, the Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribe appear to have rejected tribal economics. The Shoshone-
Bannock are only required to reimburse Idaho for expenses incurred 
through regulation because the Tribe successfully fought against the 
imposition of the donative revenue sharing requirement for video 
gaming.298 The Shoshone-Bannock’s compact contains a provision 
that makes it mandatory that the Tribe can offer the same games as 
other Idaho tribes.299 Once the Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes 
amended their compacts to include video gaming, those games 
automatically became approved games in the Shoshone-Bannock’s 
compact.300  
The Shoshone-Bannock successfully argued before the Ninth 
Circuit that the donation requirement was a tax within the meaning 
of its compact.301 It appears that the Shoshone-Bannock refuse to 
act as a good neighbor to neighboring state citizens despite the State 
fostering the growth of tribal economies by making video gaming a 
valid Class III game. The Shoshone-Bannock’s refusal to engage 
Idaho in good faith after the passage of Proposition One also 
undermined kinship relations with the other Idaho tribes because it 
used their detriment for its own benefit by exploiting a technicality. 
In general, Idaho uniquely stands out against the norm of 
revenue sharing agreements.302 All Idaho has done is set a 
                                                                                                             
297 Tribal-State Compact, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho-Idaho., § 6.8.3 (2002) 
(compact approved and published 68 Fed. Reg. 1068); Tribal-State Compact, 
Nez Perce Tribe-Idaho., § 6.4.3 (2002) (compact approved and published 68 
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298 Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Tribal-State Compact, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes-Idaho., §§ 13–14 (2000) 
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§ 24(d) (2000) (compact approved and published 65 Fed. Reg. 54541–2). 
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301 Id. at 1101. 
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percentage of revenue of revenue that the Tribe must donate. The 
State allows the tribe to decide where their revenue goes and does 
not arbitrarily spend it at will. The tribe can steward its revenue and 
donate it to purposes that benefit both the tribe and the neighboring 
state citizens. Although Idaho requires that compacts do “not 
obligate the state of Idaho to appropriate state funds” to the tribes,303 
the State does appear to have taken the initiative in acknowledging 
tribal economics and the inherent benefits gaming provides the 
State.  
The tribal gaming economy is estimated to draw over 500,000 
people with sixty percent traveling from another state to Idaho.304 In 
2014, tribal gaming provided the tribes and Idaho with 3,361 jobs 
accounting for over $81 million in wages and salaries.305 Indeed, 
gaming has allowed tribes to become large employers in their 
respective regions and their willingness to employ state citizens 
demonstrates a desire to maintain and build kinship relations. Even 
though times of difficulty arise between the tribes and the State,306 
their willingness to deal in good faith shines through. However, this 
willingness is not absolute.  
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a Senate bill that 
repealed a law that allowed wagering on “historical” horse races at 
                                                                                                             
Compact, Nez Perce Tribe-Idaho., § 6.1 (2008) (compact approved and 
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race tracks.307 The Coeur d’Alene Tribe introduced the repeal bill 
into the Idaho Legislature.308 The bill passed through both houses of 
the Idaho Legislature with “overwhelming numbers,” but the 
Governor and Secretary of State refused to make the bill active 
law.309 The Governor also failed to veto the bill in accordance with 
the Idaho Constitution. The Court ordered that the bill be made 
formal law because of the Governor’s failure to veto it.310 Despite 
this wrinkle in relations between the tribes and the Governor, who 
did not act to promote kinship relations, the tribes enjoy certainty in 
knowing what their revenue is used for. The tribe stewards their 
revenue for education on and near the reservation as they see fit.  
Despite the Idaho Constitution’s ban on most Class III games,311 
any kinship-based economy requires both accommodation and 
equivocal exchange. It appears that Idaho is far closer than most 
states with revenue sharing agreements because of the State’s 
willingness to allow tribes to act generously through and steward 
their own revenue through donations. This approach benefits the 
whole community and can further be the rational for the State to 
again expand the games tribes can pursue for economic 
development. Idaho employs one of the closest examples of a 
cooperative federalism framework that incorporates tribal 
economics.  
 
D. No Consideration Found in Substantial Exclusivity 
 
In the states analyzed, the commonality in substantial 
exclusivity agreements appears to be that they are driven by greed 
rather than the building of kinship relationships. With the exception 
of Idaho, the states do not provide the tribes a voice on how gaming 
revenue will be used. All states secure a portion of net revenue or 
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define how a tribe can use revenue before the tribe can provide for 
its members.  
Tribal economics requires that a tribe exercises its inherent 
sovereignty to the fullest extent. While each state discussed above 
does compact with tribes, the state uses its superior bargaining 
position to limit the scope of the tribe’s gaming. Through substantial 
exclusivity arrangements, the state limits tribal sovereignty.  
For example, New York allows the Seneca Nation to engage in 
off-reservation gaming but will not allow the Tuscarora or 
Tonawanda Seneca the same ability. The Tuscarora and 
Tonawanda’s sovereignty is impeded upon. Oklahoma’s statutory 
exclusivity is not the result of a tribe negotiating for a good faith 
compact. Oklahoma provides a mere adhesion contract that denies 
the tribe the ability to do best for its members. California requires 
gaming tribes to subsidize non-gaming tribes through the RSTF and 
the State through the SDF. The only thing tribes in California 
receive is Constitutional protection that California voters can 
rescind at any time. If that happens, tribes will be forced to decide 
between abandoning their gaming enterprise or surrendering to the 
remaining terms of the compact. California tribes are now dependent 
on California citizens for gaming being a successful form of 
economic development. Idaho, in contrast with the other States, does 
lend more to an acknowledgment of inherent sovereignty. The State 
allows the tribe to allocate funds as the tribe sees fit. However, 
substantial exclusivity for Idaho tribes is defined on the Idaho 
Constitution’s ban on casino gaming.312 This does limit tribal 
sovereignty because the tribe cannot operate gaming off the 
reservation and the tribe is dependent on Idaho voters not rescinding 
the Constitutional provision, albeit highly unlikely to occur. 
Sovereignty is ignored because the tribe’s ability to continue Class 
III gaming is contingent on the State’s actions in regards to the 
substantial exclusivity provisions. 
In tribal economics, good faith requires fair dealing and 
equivocal exchange.313 Good faith also requires acknowledgment of 
the community’s needs, not just the individual. New York, 
Oklahoma, and California each refuse to compact in good faith. New 
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York has caused the Seneca Nation to reject its kin in the 
Tonawanda Seneca and Tuscarora Tribes. Although each tribe has 
its own reservation land, the rejection of traditional kinship 
networks demonstrates how New York’s dealings forces the tribe to 
abandon the other tribes that are part of their community. 
Oklahoma’s model compact goes further by preventing tribes from 
acknowledging kin within the state by presenting a model compact 
as an adhesion contract. There is no room for negotiation and the bar 
on non-tribal gaming does not account for equivocal exchange. 
California’s Constitutional provision for substantial exclusivity 
does not provide a tribe anything as its illusory nature shows. The 
revenue tribes are forced to contribute to the RSTF and SDF is not 
an equivocal exchange. The lack of negotiation and accommodation 
between these states and tribes is astounding but not surprising. 
Idaho does attempt to promote good faith as seen through its 
willingness to expand Class III games for tribes. Idaho also allows 
tribes to account for their community by allowing the tribes to 
determine whom it will gift its revenue to through donations. 
Although not perfect, Idaho is attempting to act in good faith 
through the cooperative federalism framework the IGRA is 
supposed to present. 
Stewardship of gaming revenue by the tribe is also absent in 
revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity agreements in compacts 
found in New York, Oklahoma, and California. New York’s forcing 
of the Seneca Nation to provide substantial percentages of its net 
drop does not allow the Tribe to determine how its revenue is spent. 
Rather the State decides. Oklahoma does the same through its model 
compact as does California through the RSTF and SDF. By refusing 
the tribe to allocate its revenue as it sees fit, the tribe can become 
disinclined to gift surplus revenue to the outside community and 
other tribes. This is the error found in California’s SDF. No tribe 
should be forced to subsidize other tribes unless the tribe itself wants 
to better the whole community or reinforce traditional kinship 
networks. Idaho does incentivize tribes to act for the betterment of 
the whole community by allowing tribes to determine how its 
revenue will be spent. This allows tribes in Idaho to steward its 
resources and gift it as donations. 
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As the illusory nature of substantial exclusivity demonstrates, 
there simply is no consideration in these arrangements. This is 
definitely true when analyzed through tribal economics. The 
Secretary is charged with ensuring the trust relationship between the 
United States and tribes is protected through 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
However, the Secretary fails to do this by ratifying each tribal-state 
compact. Trust is breached because of the Seminole decision’s 
declaration that the good faith enforcement process is 
unconstitutional.314 That holding allows states to hold hostage tribes 
who want to engage in Class III gaming. The only recourse for tribes 
is to agree to revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity if the state 
demands it. This demonstrates a lack of good faith because there is 
no equivocal exchange nor is there fair dealing. The state acts 
individualistically and greedily despite the tribe being part of the 
state. This discourages gift giving and donation by tribes to the state 
or other tribes. This erosion of traditional kinship networks is further 
harmed by substantial exclusivity. Other tribes can become limited 
in their ability to pursue Class III gaming if their land is within 
another tribe’s range of exclusivity. This is what the Seneca 
Nation’s compact illustrates. While the Tonawanda and Tuscarora 
could engage in Class III gaming on their reservations, the tribes are 
not able to expand off-reservation.  
Substantial exclusivity tends to cause fragmentation rather than 
fostering the creation and expansion of a kinship network that 
incorporates all tribes and states. Once one tribe receives access to 
games outside of the scope of the exclusive arrangement, other 
tribes are quick require the same benefits at the expense of the other 
tribes. The Shoshone-Bannock’s exploitation of Idaho’s good faith 
attempt to expand Class III gaming exemplifies this. States know 
their superior bargaining position and although they have multiple 
socioeconomic reasons to consider the whole community, American 
capitalism’s focus on profits tend to drive negotiations. The 
Secretary merely rubber stamps compacts with substantial 
exclusivity agreements with little substantive criticism. As shown, 
these agreements do not have adequate consideration within a tribal 
economy. Changes are needed to ensure tribes can pursue economic 
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development with substantial exclusivity providing adequate 
consideration within a tribal economy. 
 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
If the IGRA is to be a stimulus for cooperative federalism,315 
states need to have limits placed on to them due to their superior 
bargaining position. Action has to come from Congress, the 
Department of the Interior, and tribes themselves because states 
have shown little willingness to negotiate with tribes appropriately. 
Because the IGRA allows revenue sharing and substantial 
exclusivity agreements as a policy rationale, states tend to mask 
greed through preemptive fears that socioeconomic conditions will 
deteriorate in the area surrounding the reservation.316 Limits on state 
bargaining power need to account for tribal economics so gaming 
tribes can include tribal forms of trade into negotiations. Through 
the inclusion of kinship economics, compassion, and a willingness 
to accommodate one another, states and tribes can overcome the 
greed that currently underlies the compacts that purport to provide 
substantial exclusivity. 
First, Congress needs to amend the IGRA to limit what states can 
do with net revenue generated by revenue sharing agreements. 
Because states tend to see substantial exclusivity agreements as 
gratuitous gifts,317 tribes have an expectation of reciprocal gift 
exchanges. The IGRA should require states to invest the funds on 
the reservation land for infrastructure, communication, and 
technological improvements. Funds should also be used to fund and 
foster economic investment projects with the tribe and state citizens. 
Such projects could either be funded through compact provisions 
such as the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s or state provided grants furnished 
by funds received through revenue sharing. Not only would this 
demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with each other as 
sovereigns, the state would be able to reinvest the funds for what 
they were designed to do, improve the reservation and surrounding 
areas. These actions would foster the development of proper kinship 
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relationships between all relevant parties because accommodation 
would occur for the betterment of all persons involved. In other 
words, it would create a community, not divided populations. This 
would provide the tribes and the state a substantial economic benefit 
and provide the adequate consideration that is currently not found in 
substantial exclusivity. 
Second, Congress needs to realize that substantial exclusivity 
arrangements are illusory. Most agreements rest on the false notion 
that the state suffers by allowing gaming on tribal lands especially 
when the state does not circumvent any state law by compacting. 
Substantial exclusivity has provided the states a method to force 
tribes to bargain away their sovereignty. Before providing for tribal 
members, the tribe is forced to provide an economic benefit derived 
from a form of economic development oftentimes barred by state 
law. Congress should either require tribes to ascertain what a proper 
per capita payment would be for its members on a yearly basis to 
assist in providing a suitable quality of life or estimate the amount 
necessary for governmental investment for the development of the 
reservation. In other words, Congress should require tribes to begin 
stewarding revenue in anticipation of realizing the revenue. With 
these estimates, the tribe can negotiate with the state what a proper 
gift would be and further steward the funds to build a kinship 
relationship with the state based on understanding. Accommodation 
would occur because the revenue projections would allow the state 
and tribe to negotiate what would be a reasonable contribution by 
the tribe would be for state projects within and near the reservation. 
This would stimulate cooperation between the sovereigns and 
benefit all people affected positively and negatively by the gaming 
enterprise. 
Third, the Department of the Interior should institute regulations 
that define a “substantial economic benefit.” Proper guidance when 
compacting is inexistent because the Secretary looks to pleas by the 
tribe and state that a benefit is included in a substantial exclusivity 
provision, then either makes an ad hoc determination or ignores the 
compact to implicitly approve it 45 days later. The regulations 
would need to focus on the building of the community surrounding 
the tribe and within the reservation. Granted, the Department is 
hamstrung by the Seminole decision, but that does not mean that the 
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states should be allowed to run rampant. The Secretary is required 
to ensure that tribes are not subject to contracts where they are 
forced to pay excessive fees for limited services.318 Regulations that 
actually define “substantial economic benefit” would provide 
revenue sharing agreements consideration in a tribal economy and 
benefit all parties. 
Finally, tribes need to step up and become proactive at the 
negotiating table and agree to directly assist the state. Not through 
revenue sharing agreements, but through surplus funds. Granted, not 
all tribes can contribute large amounts of money. The display of 
good faith by the tribe, as exemplified by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
that a partnership does exist is what tribal economics is about. The 
gift does not necessarily need to be substantial in relation to revenue 
after fees and costs have been accounted for, but both sides need to 
assist each other the best they can for a kinship economy to work. 
This allows the true nature of tribal economics to be implemented 
into cooperative federalism because the tribe’s generosity should 
provide an imprint on the state. The state should then feel more 
compelled to assist the tribe because at the end of the day, the tribe, 
albeit sovereign, is part of the state’s community. The tribes need to 
assist in expenditures in proportion to the inherent economic 
benefits the state receives from gaming. It is apparent that at least 
for the near future, revenue sharing agreements will continue. Yet, 
the display of community through such gifts could compel the state 
to actually give the tribe a substantial economic benefit in the form 
of investment grants and opportunities to assist the whole 
community. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Substantial exclusivity agreements do not provide tribes 
consideration either in traditional contract law or in tribal 
economics. Substantial exclusivity has become a way to fractionate 
tribes and the surrounding communities while providing an 
economic windfall to the state. As the very first substantial 
exclusivity provision between Connecticut and the Mashantucket 
Pequot demonstrates, tribes are pitted against one another. In order 
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for the Mohegan Tribe to pursue Class III gaming, Connecticut had 
to rescind the Pequot’s exclusivity. The Shoshone-Bannock’s action 
in getting the Ninth Circuit to declare the imposition of a five 
percent donative requirement to engage in video gaming also 
represents the systems flaws. Because the Nez Perce and Kootenai 
Tribes agreed to the provision, the Shoshone-Bannock had no reason 
to work for the betterment of the State and other Idaho tribes. 
Although their actions demonstrate a rejection of tribal economics, 
the compacting requirement has at least in part caused these actions. 
With courts refusing to acknowledge the inherent duress tribes 
endure in seeking to engage in self-determination, states are able to 
continue bad faith negotiations when a substantial revenue source is 
prime for the taking. The false premise that gaming makes tribes 
immediately wealthy does not assist because it makes state citizens 
pressure the state, that could be dealing with a decreasing budget, to 
demand revenue sharing. This further erodes tribal economics 
because the state’s position to create the best outcome for state 
citizens comes at the tribe’s expense. Revenue sharing simply has 
no basis in good faith nor equivocal exchange; it is a money grab. 
Although some states, such as Idaho, have tried to find a middle 
ground in allowing the tribe to allocate the funds as they see fit, New 
York, Oklahoma, and California demonstrate that Idaho is the 
exception, not the norm. 
Revenue sharing hinders a tribe’s ability to reinvest its proceeds 
and diversify its holdings for the betterment of the whole 
community, not just the tribal members. Because of this, tribes are 
reluctant and often are unable to be generous with earnings because 
surplus funds are not being used to appease the states, net revenues 
are. This harms the tribe’s ability to steward and protect its economy 
because of the lack of community. The Seminole decision has forced 
many tribes to depend on the state for protection and development 
of its economy. This new form of dependency infringes on the very 
core of tribal sovereignty because the tribe and the state are unable 
to build a kinship relationship as the linking of arms between 
brothers who are equal. Rather, conflict and greed ensnare the 
compacting process and demonstrates how substantial exclusivity 
does not provide tribes adequate consideration within a tribal 
economy. Changes are needed and can only occur if Congress, the 
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Secretary, states, and tribes step up to the plate to better each 
respective community that is impacted by a tribal-state compact. 
 
